A Brief Survey of the House Allocation Problems

Authors

  • İpek Gürsel Tapkı Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Turkey
  • Elif Akben Selçuk Faculty of Management, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Turkey

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18488/journal.100.2017.31.1.5

Keywords:

Mechanism design, Game theory, House allocation, Housing market, Matching, Random serial dictatorship

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to briefly review house allocation problems. We first give the definition and the aim of the mechanism design theory. Next we discuss its applications to markets with no monetary transfer, such as house allocation, kidney exchange and school choice. We review the literature for (i) house allocation problems, (ii) house allocation problems with existing tenants, and (iii) house allocation problems with existing tenants and newcomers.

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Published

2017-08-07

Issue

Vol. 3 No. 1 (2017)

Section

Articles

How to Cite

A Brief Survey of the House Allocation Problems. (2017). Games Review, 3(1), 1-5. https://doi.org/10.18488/journal.100.2017.31.1.5