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Examining the role of board subcommittees in driving financial performance: CEO duality as a moderator

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyze the impact of board subcommittees (BS) on the financial performance (FP) of listed companies in the Vietnamese stock market from 2012 to 2023. It also investigates the moderating role of Chief Executive Officer duality (CEOD) in the relationship between BS and FP. Using panel data from 229 listed firms with 2,748 observations, the study applies Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FEM), and Random Effects Model (REM). The most appropriate model is selected based on Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) tests. The findings indicate that BS significantly influences FP. Furthermore, CEOD plays a moderating role in this relationship, especially through profitability indicators. These results suggest that firms should strengthen the design and operation of BS and establish appropriate monitoring mechanisms when the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) holds concurrent positions to reduce excessive concentration of power and improve governance effectiveness.

Contribution/Originality: The study provides empirical evidence in the frontier market of Vietnam on the impact of BS on FP and clarifies the moderating role of CEOD. In contrast, most previous studies have focused on developed markets. The results offer suggestions for businesses in designing BS and for policymakers in improving the legal governance framework.

1. INTRODUCTION

Board subcommittees (BS) are important for enhancing financial performance (FP) of firms by enhancing transparency, facilitating strategic decisions, and enhancing risk management. According to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2023), the formation of advisory committees should be established according to its principles, so as to enhance the performance of the Board of Directors (BD) generally. The BS should be given unrestricted access to information, to financial resources, and, as needed, to the ability to hire independent experts. Yet the BD is the organisation with ultimate liability for all decisions, unless the law says differently.

The mandate, composition, and modus operandi of the BS should be transparent to guarantee good practice and liability. Subcommittees allow the BD to confront such issues more comprehensively and efficiently by addressing them in specific areas. Especially, transparent responsibility, range of activities, and the composition of membership play a large role in increasing accountability and elevating the quality of governance.

Clearly defining the responsibilities of each subcommittee in the BD is an important factor in limiting overlapping functions and improving the effectiveness of supporting the BD in performing core governance tasks. Studies such as Müller (2014) and Hassan, Makhlouf, Yazis, Basah, and Laili (2014) have shown that the existence and operation of subcommittees in the BD contribute to improving the FP of the company. In contrast to the positive results, some studies, such as Klein (2002), Puni and Anlesinya (2020), and Vafeas (2003), show that the existence of subcommittees can have a negative impact on FP, while Borlea, Achim, and Mare (2017) conclude that these subcommittees have no significant impact.

This demonstrates the considerable significance of enhancing the quality of members participating in BD subcommittees, especially for listed companies. Additionally, articulating the working targets of subcommittees not only improves operational efficiency but also reduces the risk of power excessiveness and inefficiency, thereby minimizing adverse effects on the company's FP.

The duality of the CEO is a controversial topic in corporate governance, with two opposing theoretical positions on its impact on the FP of the enterprise. According to agency theory, a clear separation of the CEO and Chairman of BD is necessary to ensure a balance of power and a mutual monitoring mechanism (Fama & Jensen, 1983). When an individual holds both positions simultaneously, power can be excessively concentrated, facilitating self-serving behavior, undermining the interests of shareholders and stakeholders. This concentration of power risks leading to abuse of power (Ramdani & van Witteloostuijn, 2010), weakening the monitoring mechanism, increasing agency costs, and thereby negatively affecting the FP of the enterprise.

In contrast, stewardship theory suggests that CEOD provides a firm with a strong, unified, and centralized leadership mechanism, thereby improving FP (Boyd, 1995). Ahmadi, Nakaa, and Bouri (2018) also pointed out that CEOD helps companies develop and implement more consistent strategies, thereby improving FP. In addition, CEOs play an important role in shaping and monitoring the activities of board committees (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2014). These committees are often expected to make key decisions to drive FP. This highlights the importance of leadership style, which is shaped by the interaction between CEOD and the activities of board committees. Recently, Bel-Oms and Grau Grau (2025) found that CEOD has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between BS and FP in European firms.

Although many international studies have analyzed the performance of the Management Science BS on FP, as well as the details of the CEO's job in this systemic relationship, the empirical evidence is still limited in the context of frontier markets. Especially in Vietnam, where the corporate governance system is in the process of being completed and strongly influenced by the regime's characteristics, examining these relationships is extremely necessary. Therefore, this study not only aims to fill an important academic gap but also provides valuable empirical evidence, helping to shed more light on corporate governance practices in a frontier market like Vietnam.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

According to agency theory, BS play a crucial role in monitoring, controlling, and safeguarding shareholder interests while minimizing conflicts with the executive team. They serve as specialized advisory bodies supporting BD in critical areas such as strategic development, human resources and compensation governance, internal audit, and risk management (Kanapathippillai, Puwanenthiren, Mihret, & Dang, 2024). The audit committee improves financial information transparency, reduces fraud and accounting risks, and thereby strengthens investor confidence (Truong & Nguyen, 2024). The remuneration and HR committee ensures fair compensation policies, attracts and retains talented personnel, and aligns executive incentives with FP (Bel-Oms & Grau Grau, 2025). The strategy committee supports the formulation and implementation of long-term development plans, investment optimization, and market expansion. Meanwhile, the risk management committee assists in identifying and mitigating financial, legal, and operational risks, contributing to the reduction of potential losses.

This functional specialization allows committee members to conduct in-depth research, offer thorough analysis, and provide more accurate recommendations. By preparing key issues in advance, these subcommittees enable the board to focus on strategic decisions, thereby improving FP (Anan & Suryaputri, 2023). Additionally, empirical studies by Andreou, Louca, and Panayides (2014); Grau and Bel (2022); Hassan et al. (2014); Koutoupis, Kyriakogkonas, and Kampouris (2020), and Müller (2014) support the positive influence of BS on FP. Therefore, the proposed hypothesis is:

H_1: BS has a positive impact on FP.

According to management theory, when a CEO concurrently holds multiple roles within a company, it can bring significant advantages, particularly in concentrating power and enhancing management efficiency (Boyd, 1995). Centralizing authority in a single individual facilitates faster, more flexible, and more consistent decision-making, avoiding the dispersion of power or conflicts of interest among different management levels (Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez, 2020).

A CEO who holds both roles simultaneously often has the advantage of overseeing the entire operations of the business, thereby making strategic decisions that are consistent with the long-term goals of the organization (Jackling & Johl, 2009). In addition, this duality also allows the CEO to coordinate more closely with the subcommittees of BD. Instead of having to go through many layers of intermediate management, the CEO can work directly with related departments, helping to shorten response times and increase consistency in important decisions (Ahmadi et al., 2018). This is especially valuable when companies must respond swiftly to market fluctuations or confront significant business challenges.

In addition, when a CEO plays a key role in BD, they gain deeper insight into the company's vision, strategy, and long-term objectives. This enables them to develop appropriate policies and action plans while enhancing oversight and control of company operations. A CEO closely connected with BS also contributes to improving the quality of managerial decisions, minimizing internal conflicts, and ensuring that all departments work in a unified direction toward a common goal (Bel-Oms & Grau Grau, 2025). Based on these arguments, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H_2: CEO duality positively moderates the relationship between BS and FP.

To conclude, based on previous evidence and hypothesis development, the research model is conducted based on Figure 1.



Figure 1. Proposed research model.

3. METHODOLOGY

As of December 31, 2023, a total of 739 companies were officially listed on Vietnam's stock exchanges. However, this study focuses on a final sample of only 229 non-financial companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX). Firms were excluded from the sample if they failed to meet either of two key criteria: (1) being listed before 2012, and (2) having complete financial data available throughout the research period. Additionally, only non-financial firms were included to ensure the consistency and relevance of the analysis.

These selection criteria were applied to enhance the robustness, balance, and appropriateness of the dataset. The research data was sourced from Vietstock, a reputable and comprehensive financial and securities information portal in Vietnam (https://en.vietstock.vn/). Financial data was derived from audited financial statements, while relevant non-financial information was collected from companies' annual reports. In addition, for the research data analysis method, panel data regression techniques, including FEM, REM, and OLS, are employed to determine the most appropriate model for the research findings. Besides, the GMM model is used in this study to fix the endogenous problems for the independent and control variables.

In order to rigorously evaluate the effect of BS on FP, as well as to investigate the moderating role of CEOD in this relationship, the following research models are developed.

Model 1: $FP_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 BS_{it} + \beta_2 SIZE_{it} + \beta_3 LEV_{it} + \beta_4 FAU_{it} + \beta_5 CFO_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$

Model 2: $FP_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 BS_{it} + \beta_2 BS\ x\ CEOD_{it} + \beta_3 SIZE_{it} + \beta_4 LEV_{it} + \beta_5 FAU_{it} + \beta_6 CFO_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$

Where:

- β0, β1, …, β6 are the correlation coefficients.
- ε: error term.

The variables, along with their descriptions and measurements, are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Variable definitions and measurements.

Code	Variables	Formula	Reference
Dependent variables			
FP	Firm performance		
ROE	Return on equity	ROE gauges FP by measuring the profitability of shareholders' equity.	Salehi, Ammar Ajel, and Zimon (2023)
Independent variables			
BS	Board subcommittees	BS is a dummy variable representing the number of subcommittees under BD. It equals 1 if the number exceeds the sample median, and 0 otherwise	Ji, Talavera, and Yin (2020)
Moderated variable			
CEODB	The moderated variable is derived from the interaction between BS and CEOD, calculated using the following formula: CEODB = BS x CEOD		
CEOD	CEO-duality	CEOD is a binary variable reflecting the dual role of the CEO and BOD chairperson. If the CEO and chairman are the same person, CEOD = 1; otherwise, CEOD = 0.	Gerged, Kuzey, Uyar, and Karaman (2023)
Control variables			
SIZE	Corporate size	Logarithmic Transformation of Total Assets	Ding, Yang, and Chung (2018)
LEV	Capital structure leverage	Total Liabilities to Total Assets	Gerged et al. (2023)
CFO	Operating Cash Flow Ratio	Cash Flow from Operations over Total Assets	Das (2018)
FAU	Audit firm size	Assigned a value of 1 when the auditor belongs to the Big Four group, and 0 when not	Mathuva, Tauringana, and Owino (2019)

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the model. Accordingly, in terms of FP, as measured by return on equity (ROE), the average ROE for Vietnamese companies stands at 9.7%. However, there is considerable variation across firms (With a standard deviation of 0.137, significantly higher than the mean of 0.097).

Notably, some companies exhibit strong financial performance, with a maximum ROE of 0.982, while others demonstrate poor operational efficiency, with the lowest recorded ROE at -1.733.

Regarding the BS factor, which is determined by the value of the dummy variable, only 17.2% of Vietnamese companies feature a large number of BS. Additionally, when CEOD exists, only 17.1% of companies in Vietnam have executives holding roles both in management and on BD. As for the moderating effect of executive duality on the presence of BS, the average value of this variable is 0.015.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics.

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
ROE	2748	0.097	0.137	-1.733	0.982
BS	2748	0.172	0.377	0	1
CEOD	2748	0.171	0.377	0	1
CEODB	2748	0.015	0.123	0	1
SIZE	2748	27.599	1.615	23.322	34.135
LEV	2748	0.466	0.226	0.001	0.992
FAU	2748	0.303	0.46	0	1
CFO	2748	0.054	0.147	-1.57	1.008

4.2. Correlation Analysis and VIF Value

Table 3 reflects the results of the correlation analysis between variables in the research model.

First, with the correlation results with ROE, where Pearson correlation > 0, both factors - BS (0.003) and the moderating effect of the CEOD on BS (0.022)- are assessed to have a positive correlation with ROE. In addition, with Pearson correlation < 0, the factor related to the CEOD (-0.042) is expected to have a negative correlation with ROE.

Regarding the VIF index, which ranges from 1 to 2 based on the average value, all the independent and control factors in the model are considered not to exhibit multicollinearity.

Table 3. Correlation analyst.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	VIF
(1) ROE	1.000								
(2) BS	0.003	1.000							1.044
(3) CEOD	-0.042**	-0.099***	1.000						1.183
(4) CEODB	0.022	0.274***	0.274***	1.000					1.291
(5) SIZE	0.075***	0.159***	-0.104***	0.011	1.000				1.506
(6) LEV	-0.159***	0.046**	-0.015	-0.034*	0.304***	1.000			1.191
(7) FAU	0.086***	0.189***	-0.076***	0.015	0.490***	0.000	1.000		1.392
(8) CFO	0.288***	-0.005	-0.033*	-0.009	0.001	-0.214***	0.097***	1.000	1.059
Mean VIF									1.238

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

4.3. Model Selection Testing

Based on Table 4, which presents the results of model selection among OLS, FEM, and REM. FEM is selected for both Model 1 and Model 2, as indicated by p-values less than 0.05 in both the F-test and Hausman test.

After determining the appropriate model, model errors were re-evaluated using the Modified Wald test for heteroscedasticity and the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation. With p-values below 0.05 in both tests, the FEM models for both Model 1 and Model 2 were found to suffer from heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation issues.

Therefore, the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) model is chosen as the model to present the results for both models, as it addresses and corrects the errors found in the fixed effects models.

Table 4. Model Selection Tests.

Kinds of examination	Model 1	Model 2
F-test	5.73***	5.77***
Hausman	126.59***	128.47***
Modified Wald	2.2e+06***	3.3e+06***
Wooldridge	42.289***	39.575***

Note: *** p<0.01.

In the GMM estimation, the Wu–Hausman test in the 2SLS framework is used to check whether endogeneity is a problem, and the instrumental variables used are valid in both specifications. Results (p-value ≤ 0.05) indicate that firm size, leverage, and operating cash flow should be viewed as endogenous variables, and board subcommittees, CEO duality, and CEODB are found to be good instruments. Full results from the GMM estimates are presented in the following Table 5.

Table 5. Wu–Hausman Test Results.

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
BS	0.5	0.471
CEOD	-	0.153
CEODB	-	1.23
SIZE	260.46***	259.32***
LEV	16.53***	16.38***
FAU	2.1	2.2
CFO	120.18***	125.59***

Note: *** p<0.01.

Taking into account the outcomes of the diagnostic tests, the GMM estimation emerges as the most appropriate specification, addressing concerns of endogeneity and instrument validity. Therefore, it is selected as the final model to ensure the robustness and reliability of the empirical results.

4.4. Regression Results

According to examinations for the GMM model outcome, with p-value <= 0.05 for AR(1) information and p-value > 0.05 for AR(2), Sargan, Hansen, GMM instrument, and other variable examination, the GMM model outcome is accepted for model 1 and model 2 to conclude this research. Based on the results in Table 6 of Model 1, BS has a negative correlation with firm performance (FP), as measured by ROE, and is statistically significant at the 1% level, with a coefficient of -0.026 (< 0) and a p-value < 0.01. This result indicates that an increase in BS is associated with a gradual decline in FP. An increase in the number of BS can lead to a decline in FP for several reasons. Firstly, each subcommittee incurs operational costs such as personnel, documentation, and meeting organization, which increase governance expenses without necessarily generating proportional value. Moreover, having too many subcommittees can complicate and slow down the decision-making process due to multiple layers of review and approval, reducing the company's responsiveness to market changes.

Additionally, without clear role definitions, subcommittees may overlap in function, create conflicting directives, or operate in a symbolic manner, which dilutes accountability and oversight effectiveness. When too many governance objectives fragment BD, the focus on FP may weaken, negatively affecting profit optimization and capital efficiency. Therefore, the establishment of an excessive number of subcommittees, if not strategically designed, can be counterproductive and diminish a company's FP. This research finding aligns with the conclusions of Vafeas (2003) and Puni and Anlesinya (2020), both of whom identified a negative relationship between BS and FP. However, this result contradicts the initial hypothesis H1. It diverges from several previous studies, such as those by Müller (2014) and Hassan et al. (2014), which suggested that BS has a positive impact on FP.

Table 6. Regression results.

Variables	Model 1					Model 2				
	OLS	FEM	REM	FGLS	GMM	OLS	FEM	REM	FGLS	GMM
L.ROE					0.44***					0.432***
BS	-0.003	-0.041***	-0.02**	-0.008*	-0.026***	-0.008	-0.045***	-0.025***	-0.011**	-0.033***
CEOD						-0.013*	-0.003	-0.009	-0.011***	-0.021***
CEODB						0.038*	0.075***	0.062***	0.026*	0.066***
SIZE	0.01***	0.025***	0.013***	0.011***	0.002***	0.01***	0.028***	0.013***	0.011***	0.001***
LEV	-0.084***	-0.103***	-0.097***	-0.077***	0.047***	-0.083***	-0.106***	-0.097***	-0.075***	0.051***
FAU	0.002	-0.004	0.001	0.008**	0.038***	0.002	-0.004	0	0.008**	0.039***
CFO	0.24***	0.085***	0.129***	0.081***	0.122***	0.239***	0.085***	0.128***	0.082***	0.127***
Constant	-0.147***	-0.552***	-0.221***	-0.169***	-0.036***	-0.138***	-0.614***	-0.222***	-0.166***	-0.022***
Model information										
R-square	0.105	0.023	0.092			0.107	0.027	0.092		
F-test/Chi-square	64.485	11.841	122.213	292.822	221130.6	46.783	10.055	129.640	306.893	269926.76
p-value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Observations	2748	2748	2748	2748	2519	2748	2748	2748	2748	2519
AR(1) (p-value)					<0.001					<0.001
AR(2) (p-value)					0.123					0.128
Sargan					219.34					223.67
p-value					0.333					0.262
Hansen					211.21					213.38
p-value					0.483					0.441
GMM instrument										
Hansen examination					181.25					181.6
p-value					0.357					0.35
Differences examination					29.26					31.78
p-value					0.751					0.67
Iv for variables										
Hansen examination					211.16					213.03
p-value					0.464					0.409
Differences examination					0.05					1.35
p-value					0.825					0.717

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

According to the results of Model 2, CEOD weakens the negative relationship between BS and FP. This implies that CEOD plays a positive moderating role in the relationship between BS and FP, as recognized at a significance level of p-value = 0.01, with a coefficient of 0.066 > 0 and p-value < 0.01. From the perspective of Stewardship Theory, a dual-role CEO is considered a leader who is oriented toward serving the organization, prioritizing the long-term interests of the company and its shareholders over personal gains. With concentrated authority and a clear strategic vision, a CEO holding both roles can more effectively coordinate the activities of BS, ensure consistency in governance, and streamline decision-making processes.

This is especially relevant in the context of businesses facing rapid market fluctuations, requiring flexible and timely responses. When transparency and accountability mechanisms are effectively implemented, CEOD not only does not undermine the monitoring role but also contributes to improving governance efficiency, reducing administrative costs, and optimizing resource allocation. Therefore, in professional and well-designed governance systems, CEOD can exert a positive impact, supporting the relationship between BS activities and corporate FP. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis H2 and the study of Bel-Oms and Grau Grau (2025), which emphasizes the moderating role of CEOD in the relationship between BS and FP.

Low R-squared is a common phenomenon in corporate governance research because FP is affected by many factors that are difficult to observe, such as the institutional environment, business strategy, or industry characteristics. Therefore, the models can only explain part of the variation through governance characteristics (such as board structure and CEO characteristics). This does not reduce the value of the model, but reflects the complexity of the problem; importantly, the coefficients are still statistically significant and verified by robustness checks.

4.5. Robustness Analyses

To further evaluate the robustness of the findings, the analysis substitutes Return on Assets (ROA) for ROE as the dependent variable representing FP. When re-estimating the GMM model using this alternative measure, results indicate that both ROA and ROE lead to consistent and similar results. This consistency gives confidence that the principal findings about the association between BS and FP and the role of the CEO as a moderator are not just dependent on the choice of the performance measure. Thus, the sensitivity analysis enhances the credibility and the generalizability of the findings. The detailed results are presented in the following Table 7.

Table 7. Robustness Test of the Main Results.

Variables	ROE model		ROA model	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
L.ROE	0.44***	0.432***	0.482***	0.476***
BS	-0.026***	-0.033***	-0.009***	-0.011***
CEOD		-0.021***		-0.011***
CEODB		0.066***		0.025***
SIZE	0.002***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
LEV	0.047***	0.051***	-0.018***	-0.017***
FAU	0.038***	0.039***	0.018***	0.019***
CFO	0.122***	0.127***	0.07***	0.072***
Constant	-0.036***	-0.022***	-0.002	0.005
Model information				
F-test/Chi-square	221130.6	269926.76	822593.85	657585.184
p-value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Observations	2519	2519	2519	2519
AR(1) (p-value)	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
AR(2) (p-value)	0.123	0.128	0.073	0.072
Sargan	219.34	223.67	209.31	210.89
p-value	0.333	0.262	0.52	0.489
Hansen	211.21	213.38	201.28	204.11
p-value	0.483	0.441	0.673	0.62

Variables	ROE model		ROA model	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
GMM instrument				
Hansen examination	181.25	181.6	182.21	186.78
p-value	0.357	0.35	0.339	0.257
Differences examination	29.26	31.78	19.06	17.33
p-value	0.751	0.67	0.991	0.996
Iv for variables				
Hansen examination	211.16	213.03	201.22	205.14
p-value	0.464	0.409	0.656	0.543
Differences examination	0.05	1.35	0.06	-1.03
p-value	0.825	0.717	0.807	1

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclusion, the findings of the study provide a more comprehensive and in-depth view of the relationship between BS and FP. The results show that expanding BD through increasing the number of subcommittees can create certain limitations, such as increasing the complexity of coordination, reducing decision-making efficiency, and leading to higher governance costs. However, these negative impacts are not absolute, but depend on the organizational context, monitoring mechanism, and the level of professionalism in designing the governance system. This implies that businesses need to carefully consider whether to expand the structure to increase specialization or maintain leanness and efficiency in operation, thereby optimizing the relationship between BD and financial performance. The presence of CEOD introduces a moderating influence that can mitigate these drawbacks by fostering stronger strategic alignment, more cohesive governance, and quicker decision-making processes. These results suggest that the impact of BS on FP is context-dependent and influenced by leadership configuration. Organizations may benefit from reevaluating not only the number and function of their BS but also the leadership dynamics at the top of the governance hierarchy. When thoughtfully designed and effectively led, particularly under stewardship-oriented CEOD, BS can support rather than impede corporate financial outcomes.

The study also recommends some practical implications. In the consideration made by the board of directors' enterprise, it is worth making some assessments regarding the optimal numbers and the functions of its subcommittees, and improving the independence of its members, increasing the effectiveness of the monitoring role, to maintain flexibility during the decision-making processes, and so forth.

For management mechanisms, it is necessary to improve the corporate governance process, provide transparency in information disclosure, prohibit the act of giving clearer guidance on the issue of CEO function costs, and strike a reasonable balance between the monitoring function and operational efficiency. These recommendations provide advice to support key business strategies in improving the quality of corporate governance in frontier markets such as Vietnam.

As for the monitoring function, the process of corporate governance needs to be enhanced, and there needs to be disclosure of information that can provide transparency, an end to the practice, so that the CEO's function costs act as clearer guidance and a balanced adjustment that takes into consideration the monitoring function and business operational efficiency. Our suggestions refer to guidance to help some of the above business strategies to enhance the quality of corporate governance in an emerging country like Vietnam.

Our study has some limitations. Specifically, we have only focused on companies officially listed on the Vietnam stock exchanges and have not expanded the scope of the research to include companies outside of this list. Therefore, we encourage future studies to broaden the survey sample and consider expanding the factors related to BS to confirm the results of this study. Furthermore, exploring the moderating relationship between CEOD, BS, and FP will provide additional important insights to clarify the factors affecting the performance outcomes of firms.

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