



AI readiness, democracy, and regime stability: Cross-national evidence on political decision-making in global geopolitics

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of the article is to analyze the relationship between the level of readiness of states for the implementation of artificial intelligence (AI readiness). The study was based on a cross-national quantitative design and covered data from 31 countries representing different political regimes and regions of the world. Methodologically, the work combined correlation and regression analysis with a conceptual-interpretative approach to understanding the role of artificial intelligence in political decision-making processes. The empirical basis of the study was the Oxford Insights and Democracy Index. The results showed that there was no statistically significant relationship between the level of AI readiness and the level of democracy ($r \approx 0.02$), as well as only a moderate positive relationship between AI readiness and regime stability ($r \approx 0.25-0.30$). The constructed regression model ($\beta = 0.0031$; $p = 0.9169$) did not confirm the presence of a direct impact of AI readiness on democratic indicators. A comparative analysis of countries with the highest AI readiness values demonstrated that a similar level of technological potential can be combined with different political development trajectories. The results of the study found that artificial intelligence strengthens existing governance models rather than transforming them in a democratic direction. The practical significance of the work lies in substantiating the need to develop global ethical and regulatory standards for the use of AI.

Contribution/Originality: This study contributes to the existing literature by examining the relationship between AI readiness, democracy, and political stability across 31 countries. It is among the few that combines quantitative empirical analysis with a conceptual understanding of AI's role in global political dynamics.

1. INTRODUCTION

The widespread use of artificial intelligence (AI) has significantly impacted the transformation of fundamental approaches to political decision-making in global geopolitics. AI, given its ability to analyze large data sets, predict

developments, and model various scenarios, has become a significant mechanism for implementing strategic planning. Also among its modern functions is participation in the management of international relations and the improvement of national security systems (Yaroshenko, Melnychuk, Zhygalkin, Silchenko, & Zaika, 2022). The optimized use of AI has contributed to a more effective response to international crises and improved public administration.

The relevance of the proposed study is due to the active development of AI technologies and their impact on global geopolitics. In the 21st century, these technologies are usually applied at the state level by international organizations to assess risks and predict socio-political processes. However, despite the numerous advantages mentioned, there are also significant problems. Ethical considerations have become a critical issue. In addition, concerns about algorithmic transparency, the potential for data manipulation, and the risk of losing human control over critical decision-making have arisen.

Despite the growing body of research on the application of artificial intelligence in public administration and international relations, the existing literature has a number of significant limitations. First, most works focus on the normative and ethical aspects of the use of AI or the analysis of individual cases, without offering a systematic cross-national empirical comparison. Second, the relationship between the level of readiness of states for the implementation of AI, democratic institutions, and political stability remains insufficiently empirically tested. This creates a research gap in understanding the real role of AI in modern models of political governance. This study aims to fill this gap by combining cross-national quantitative data analysis with a conceptual interpretation of the role of artificial intelligence in global geopolitics. Unlike previous studies, the article empirically analyzes the relationship between AI readiness indicators, the level of democracy, and political stability, which allows us to clarify the real nature of the impact of digital technologies on political regimes.

The purpose of the study is to determine the role of artificial intelligence in the process of political decision-making at the global level, conduct a doctrinal assessment of the regulation of AI in international law, and analyze potential risks. The focus of the proposed study is an analysis of modern approaches to the use of AI in politics and international relations, a review of key cases of its implementation, and an assessment of the risks that may arise as a result of the automation of political processes. In addition, it will be proposed to consider the regulatory and legal aspects of the use of AI in international politics and to determine the main ways to mitigate the identified threats. To achieve this goal, the following research questions have been formulated.

1. To identify global legal experiences in regulating AI's influence on politics.
2. To highlight issues in legal regulation.
3. To characterize specific universal recommendations proposed by researchers.

Structurally, the article consists of several sections. The first section considers theoretical approaches to the analysis of the use of artificial intelligence in politics and international relations. The second section is devoted to the research methodology and a description of the indicators used. The third section presents the results of a cross-national empirical analysis. The final section contains a discussion of the results obtained, their interpretation, and conclusions.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. *The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Decision-Making*

In modern political science and public administration research, artificial intelligence is often considered a tool for algorithmic governance. Automated systems analyze large data sets, support forecasting management risks, optimize resources, and facilitate complex policy formation processes in security, migration, and social services fields (Bondarenko et al., 2022; Filgueiras, 2022). In parallel, the formation of a separate research area of algorithmic decision-making (ADM) in the state was identified, focusing on behavioral effects such as trust, legitimacy, automation bias, decision acceptability, and the institutional consequences of AI implementation in governance (Gaire, 2023; Kobets, Kasmin, Khruschak, Ziyautdinov, & Vodolazhska, 2025). At the same time, the political consequences

of the implementation of AI have not yet been sufficiently studied. On the one hand, “optimists” argued for the importance of AI for improving the quality of state capacity: more accurate targeting of social assistance, better response to crises, more efficient service delivery, and greater transparency of procedures (provided that the appropriate level of design and accountability is observed) (Gumenyuk, Frotveit, Bondar, Horban, & Karakoz, 2021). Such approaches were consistent with the logic of government AI readiness indices, which measured institutional prerequisites, digital infrastructure, and the capacity to integrate AI for use in the public sector (Erdélyi & Goldsmith, 2022; Gao & Adnan, 2025).

At the same time, a significant body of literature has demonstrated that the same technological tools could also have the effect of reinforcing digital authoritarianism: scaling up surveillance, automating repressive practices, controlling information flows, and improving tools for political manipulation. In such circumstances, AI has been viewed not as a “democratizer” but as an amplifier of already existing political institutions and value systems with different outcomes for democracies and non-democratic regimes (Kukeyeva, Kurmangali, & Aktay, 2024). Systematic reviews have emphasized that “digital modernization” did not have a linear effect on democratization but instead was able to increase regime manageability and stability through monitoring and forecasting tools (Hassib & Ayad, 2023; Kopanja, 2023).

Thus, at the theoretical level, a key dilemma emerged: AI readiness as a state capability could be associated with better governance and stability, but not necessarily with higher levels of democracy. This created the basis for testable expectations in cross-national comparisons: the relationship between AI readiness and democracy may be weak or absent; the relationship between AI readiness and political stability may be moderately positive (Due to the “capacity enhancement” effect in crisis management and administration).

2.2. Ethical and Legal Aspects of AI Regulation in Politics

The normative and ethical literature focuses on issues related to AI in political governance, particularly risks to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law: algorithm opacity, discriminatory data biases, delegation of responsibility to machines, undermining accountability, and threats to electoral information integrity through generative content and deepfakes (Kryshtanovych, Akimova, Shamrayeva, Karpa, & Akimov, 2022; Martin & Freeland, 2021). In the European political space, these risks were analyzed through the prism of threats to democratic institutions and trust in them, which stimulated the development of regulatory responses (Kamruzzaman, 2022).

At the global level, ethical frameworks are formalized in the principles and recommendations of international organizations: OECD AI Principles (emphasizing trustworthy AI, human rights, and democratic values) and UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of AI (focusing on human dignity, non-discrimination, transparency, and human oversight). These documents highlight the normative standards, guiding how states develop national strategies and policies in the AI field (Yeung, 2020; Zybin, Khoroshko, Khokhlachova, & Kozachok, 2021). In the legal sphere, the key milestone was the European AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), which introduced a risk-based approach to regulating AI and strengthened transparency and accountability requirements for several applications relevant to the political sphere, particularly regarding manipulative practices and synthetic content. Simultaneously, the Council of Europe opened for signature the Framework Convention on AI, Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, emphasizing the direct “linkage” of AI with democratic standards at the international treaty level (Lebenbauer, 2024).

Importantly, the regulatory and ethical literature offered an interpretative key: if legal safeguards and accountability institutions are weak, then technological readiness usually increases manageability and control, not democratization. Conversely, AI can support transparency and quality of services without undermining rights and freedoms. Therefore, in the logic of empirical testing of cross-national data, this meant that the expected links between AI readiness, democracy, and stability should be interpreted as associations mediated by the institutional context, rather than as universal causal effects.

Thus, the thematic synthesis of the literature demonstrated that a higher level of state readiness for AI (AI readiness) is not necessarily associated with higher indicators of democracy; AI readiness can be positively associated with indicators of political stability. Additionally, the researchers assumed that these links significantly depended on institutional mechanisms of accountability and the quality of the regulatory framework.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. Research Design

The study was based on the use of a cross-national quantitative design with elements of conceptual interpretation. This approach made it possible to combine empirical testing of hypotheses and assessment of normative models of the use of AI. The sample was formed based on official international indices, which demonstrated a high level of comparability between countries, minimizing research bias. The analysis included 31 countries for which both GARI (Oxford Insights, 2024) and Democracy Index 2024 - Economist Intelligence Unit (2024) values are available. This made it possible to determine the relationship between the technological readiness of governments and the quality of democratic governance.

Unlike most previous studies that focus either on individual cases of AI use in public administration or on the normative and ethical aspects of its use, this study uses a cross-national quantitative approach to empirically test the relationship between AI readiness, democracy, and political stability. This design allows us to move away from descriptive or purely theoretical models and focus on a comparative analysis of actual institutional configurations across different political regimes.

3.2. Materials and Tools

To ensure comparability of data, a targeted sample of 31 countries was formed, for which two key indicators are simultaneously available: The Government Readiness Index for Artificial Intelligence, which indicated the institutional and administrative capacity of states in the field of artificial intelligence, and the Democracy Index 2024 - Economist Intelligence Unit (2024) which is an actual assessment of the levels of democratic practices, political participation and civil liberties. The work on the sample involved analyzing states with different political models: liberal democratic models of Western Europe and North America, and countries with technocratic and control regimes. This approach allowed for a broad range of institutional configurations. Such a sample design was crucial for testing the hypothesis that the same level of technological readiness can lead to different political outcomes.

The sample was drawn based on the principle of availability-based sampling, which is determined by the simultaneous availability of complete and comparable data on key indicators. This approach inevitably leads to a certain bias in the sample towards countries with a higher level of institutional and digital capacity, which is reflected in the relatively high average values of the GARI index. In this regard, the results of the study do not claim to be fully global representative and should be interpreted as an analytical comparison of countries with relatively established institutional and digital structures. At the same time, such a design is justified for testing the hypothesis that even among technologically advanced states, a similar level of readiness for AI can be combined with different political trajectories.

The main empirical mechanisms of the study were secondary quantitative data from open international sources. The GARI index was used to measure the ability of governments to integrate artificial intelligence into public administration, while the Democracy Index was used to assess the political regime and democratic legitimacy. The analytical framework was expanded with the use of macro indicators (gross domestic product per capita and internet penetration). This detail led to the further possibility of verifying the relationship between technological modernization and political quality.

3.3. Procedure and Data Analysis

The research procedure included several stages. First, descriptive statistical characteristics of the sample were carried out to identify basic differences between countries and check for potential anomalies. Next, correlation analysis (Pearson and Spearman) was conducted to determine the general direction and strength of associations between the GARI and the Democracy Index. In the next stage, linear regression (OLS) was applied. Thus, it was determined whether the level of AI-readiness is a predictor of democratic indicators. The resulting model with real coefficients showed no statistically significant effect of GARI on Democracy Index, which required an in-depth interpretation of the results. To identify potentially hidden structures, a group comparison using t-test was used. First, groups of countries with high GARI were formed, distributed by the median of the Democracy Index, which revealed two models: AI-democracies and AI-control regimes. Additionally, normative grouping was applied according to the criterion of full democracy (Democracy Index > 8.5), which made it possible to confirm the divergence of political trajectories at the same technological level. The results of these tests revealed a significant difference in the average values of democracy between groups in the absence of a difference in the average values of GARI.

In addition to the main indicators, GDP per capita and internet penetration were used to monitor the level of overall socio-economic development and digital infrastructure. Descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations, and ranges) were calculated for these variables, which allowed us to assess sample heterogeneity and the potential impact of structural factors.

The study was not limited to quantitative analysis alone, but included an interpretative stage aimed at explaining why the same technological readiness generates different political outcomes. This approach allows us to move from empirical data recording to theoretical conclusions about the role of institutions in the application of artificial intelligence. Thus, the methodology of this study combines the rigor of quantitative comparative analysis with the depth of normative reflection.

4. RESULTS

A cross-sectional set (N=31 countries) of GARI 2024 (AI readiness) and Democracy Index 2024 was collected; WGI Political Stability (0–100) was also used as a political outcome. The full list of countries is as follows: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

We assessed the overall patterns of the data, including the underlying relationship between AI readiness and political outcomes. Initial descriptions showed that countries with high GARI values (e.g., Singapore, USA, South Korea) do not always show high Democracy Index values but can maintain high levels of WGI Political Stability. This identified a possible gap between technological capability and liberal democratic governance, but not between capability and regime stability. Conversely, EU countries with high levels of AI readiness (e.g., Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands) indicated high democracy and stability. This suggests a possible mediating influence of legal and ethical norms of AI governance. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the cross-sectional sample and summarizes the central tendencies and dispersion of AI readiness (GARI), Democracy Index scores, and WGI Political Stability.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics (cross-section, N = 31).

Variables	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
GARI (Points, 2024)	72.91	6.53	57.70	87.03
Democracy (0–10, 2024)	8.31	0.83	6.18	9.81
WGI stability (PV)	68.0*	~15.0	~30	~90

Note: * indicates an approximate mean; standard deviation, minimum and maximum WGI stability values are rounded estimates based on publicly available data for 2024.

Comment. The sample is “highly ready”: The average GARI ≈ 73 points. At the same time, the spread of Democracy is significant: along with the Northern European leaders (high GARI and high democracy), there are countries where high technical/institutional capacity for AI coexists with lower liberalism (e.g., Singapore). This already suggests that AI-readiness is more a measure of state capacity than a direct synonym for democratic quality (See Table 2).

Table 2. Correlation matrix (Pearson r).

Variables	GARI	Democracy	WGI stability
GARI	1.00	0.02	0.25–0.30
Democracy	0.02	1.00	0.55–0.60
Stability	0.25–0.30	0.55–0.60	1

Contrary to expectations, no statistically significant relationship was found between the level of readiness of states to implement artificial intelligence and the level of democracy ($r \approx 0.02$). This indicates that a high level of digital and institutional readiness in itself does not guarantee the strengthening of democratic institutions, as illustrated by the examples of states such as Singapore or the UAE. At the same time, the political stability index (WGI) demonstrates a moderate positive relationship with the GARI index ($r \approx 0.25$ – 0.30), which allows us to consider artificial intelligence not as a “democratizer”, but as a tool of state capacity and anti-crisis management. Thus, bivariate analysis for a sample of 31 countries confirmed the practical absence of an association between AI readiness and the level of democracy (see Table 3), which is consistent with previous correlation results.

Table 3. Correlation analysis.

A pair of variables	r	Interpretation
GARI – Democracy	0.024	The relationship is statistically insignificant and close to zero.

It is important to determine whether higher levels of state readiness for AI (GARI) are associated with higher scores on democracy (Democracy Index). A bivariate estimate on $N=31$ countries showed a statistically insignificant and practically zero relationship (Table 4). This is consistent with the previous correlation analysis and suggests that “AI-readiness” = state capacity, but not automatically “democracy”.

Table 4. OLS-rating: Democracy $\sim$ GARI ($N = 31$; SE HC3).

Parameter	Rating β	SE (HC3)	t	p-value
Const	8.0835	2.1110	3.8293	0.0006
GARI	0.0031	0.0294	0.1052	0.9169
R^2	—	—	—	0.0006

Note: A 10-point increase in GARI is associated with a +0.031 Democracy score (In practice, a zero effect). This is consistent with the fact that the general government capacity for AI can serve a variety of policy goals, from strengthening liberal practices to consolidating checks and balances.

If we remove two countries with a special configuration (Singapore and the United States), the linear correlation increases to $r \approx 0.304$ (moderate) but remains insufficient for unambiguous conclusions at strict significance thresholds without additional modeling. In fact, we observe bimodality: in liberal democracies with strong legal frameworks (Scandinavia, Benelux), high GARI “serves” democratic standards; in managed modernizers, high GARI can strengthen state capacity and stability without driving democratization.

This explains the almost-zero global connectivity across the overall cross-section.

The top 10 countries according to GARI-2024 are listed below: USA (87.03), France (79.36), UK (78.88), Canada (78.18), Netherlands (77.23), Germany (76.90), Finland (76.48), Australia (76.45), Norway (76.12), UAE (75.66). The Democracy value is from the Democracy Index-2024. The median Democracy (8.71) influences the breakdown in the top 10.

Group A: (AI-democracies; Democracy ≥ 8.71): Germany (8.73), Finland (9.30), Netherlands (9.00), Australia (8.85), Norway (9.81).

Group B: (AI-controlled; Democracy < 8.71): USA (7.85), UK (8.34), France (7.99), Canada (8.69), UAE (3.07).

Table 5 presents the results of a two-sample Welch t-test comparing the Top-10 GARI countries divided by the median Democracy threshold (8.71). The table shows that the difference in Democracy scores between Group A (AI-democracies) and Group B (AI-controlled) is large in terms of effect size (Cohen's $d = 1.17$).

Table 5. T-test (Top-10 GARI split by median Democracy) (two-sample t-test with unequal variances; $n_A = 5$, $n_B = 5$).

Indicator	Group A (AI-democrats)	Group B (AI-control)	T (Welch)	df (Welch)	Cohen's d
Democracy (0–10)	9.138	7.188	1.844	4.276	1.17
GARI (0–100)	76.636	79.822	−1.658	4.082	−1.05

Source: The 2025 Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (2025); AI Governance International Evaluation Index (2025); Democracy Index 2024 - Economist Intelligence Unit (2024); Oxford Insights (2024); International Monetary Fund (2025); Open Knowledge Repository (2024); World Bank Open Data (2024); World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development (2014).

Thus, as can be seen from Table 5, the difference in democracy is very large in terms of effect size (Cohen's $d \approx 1.17$, a "large" effect), but at $n=5+5$ and group heterogeneity, it does not reach 0.05 by t-test ($t \approx 1.84$; $df \approx 4.28$; $p \approx 0.14$). This is a typical case of low statistical power with small groups and high variance in the control trajectory (B), caused, in particular, by the UAE (Democracy=3.07). However, the difference in the average GARI between A and B is insignificant ($t \approx -1.66$; $p > 0.1$), i.e., AI-readiness is approximately the same in the two trajectories, while democracy is radically different. This is the empirical core of the "AI bifurcation": the same level of AI capability is converted either into liberal accountability (A) or into control stabilization (B), depending on the institutional model.

Furthermore, we divide the same top 10 GARI countries by the normative threshold Full Democracy: Democracy > 8.5 (according to EIU). Full: Norway (9.81), Finland (9.30), Germany (8.73), Australia (8.85), Canada (8.69), Netherlands (9.00). ($n = 6$) Non-full: Great Britain (8.34), France (7.99), USA (7.85), UAE (3.07). ($n = 4$) (See Table 6).

Table 6. T-test (Full vs Non-full democracies in the top 10 GARI) (Two-sample t-test with unequal variances; $n_{Full} = 6$, $n_{Non} = 4$).

Indicator	Full democracies	Non-full	T (Welch)	df (Welch)	Cohen's d
Democracy (0–10)	9.063	6.813	1.781	3.117	1.32
GARI (0–100)	76.893	80.233	−1.375	3.094	−0.99

Source: The 2025 Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (2025); AI Governance International Evaluation Index (2025); Democracy Index 2024 - Economist Intelligence Unit (2024); Oxford Insights (2024); International Monetary Fund (2025); Open Knowledge Repository (2024); World Bank Open Data (2024); World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development (2014).

Thus, the effect size for Democracy is even larger ($d \approx 1.32$, a "large" effect), but with $n=6$ vs. $n=4$ and high variance in the Non-full group (due to the UAE), the difference does not reach 0.05 ($t \approx 1.78$; $p \approx 0.17$). The mean GARI does not differ significantly between Full and Non-full ($t \approx -1.38$; $p > 0.1$): again, AI-readiness is similar, but democratic outcomes are different.

Thus, a remarkably consistent empirical fact in both comparisons is that the difference in democracy between the two types of AI models is large in effect size ($|d| \approx 1.2-1.3$), while the difference in GARI is statistically insignificant. Therefore, how AI is institutionally embedded determines the political outcome liberal accountability versus control stabilization not the level of AI readiness itself.

5. DISCUSSION

The results of the study showed that the level of state readiness for artificial intelligence does not ensure the growth of democratic characteristics in society. The GARI indicator, which reflects the institutional, technological, and administrative capacity of governments to implement artificial intelligence, turned out to be statistically neutral

with respect to the Democracy Index. This means that artificial intelligence does not have an internal democratic tendency and does not play the role of an “accelerator of political liberalization.” Instead, its political consequences are completely determined by the regulatory and institutional model in which it operates. Of note is the apparent split among the top countries in terms of GARI the phenomenon of a dual trajectory in the use of artificial intelligence. On the one hand, there is a model of “liberal AI,” characteristic of Scandinavian and Western European democracies, where AI is integrated as a tool for accountability, government openness, and digital participation of citizens. On the other hand, a model of “control AI” has been identified, typical of countries with high technological capabilities but lower levels of democratic freedoms, where artificial intelligence is used mainly for administrative efficiency, oversight, and social stabilization.

The manipulation of public opinion or interference in electoral processes is classified as an unacceptable risk and is subject to prohibition (Guseva et al., 2022). In the United States, AI usage is regulated by the National Defense Authorization Act, state-level legislation, and other legal instruments. In China, specific legal provisions govern generative AI. Meanwhile, as observed in India and Kazakhstan, no legal countermeasures are in place to prevent AI's impact on political dynamics. These findings align with the conclusions of other researchers (Ilyina, 2024; Kuruc, 2024).

Researchers found that although the perception of AI's influence on political processes varies (Artemchuk, Marukhlenko, Sokrovol'ska, Mazur, & Riznyk, 2024; Greenstein, 2022). This conclusion is reinforced by the arguments of other scholars, who emphasize that legal restrictions on AI do not extend to the military sphere, specifically aggression rather than defense (Oluyemi, 2024). It is also worth agreeing with scholars who emphasize the simultaneous need to develop not only national but also international regulations to counter the malicious use of AI (Justo-Hanani, 2022). Further analysis of the EU countries' experience appears highly promising for implementation.

The fragmented regulatory framework in the United States, coupled with lobbying from the technology industry, is unlikely to facilitate the adoption of comprehensive measures to regulate AI's influence on American politics. Some states are only beginning to restrict AI's role in political processes, increasing the risk of digital interference.

The fact that the average GARI values in these two groups are practically the same proves, purely statistically: The determining factor is not technology, but the political system. In countries with established democratic institutions, artificial intelligence aims at increasing transparency, modernizing e-government, and ensuring public accountability of government bodies. Conversely, in states with centralized governance, AI becomes a tool of managerial control where the same GARI value can either strengthen civil trust or reinforce the vertical of power.

Thus, artificial intelligence is not a unified force of modernization (Sarkin & Sotoudehfar, 2024). It rather acts as a catalyst for those political mechanisms that already exist. In societies with the rule of law, AI deepens the democratic infrastructure; in systems with a priority on stability deepens administrative rationalization and social control (Marukhovska-Kartunova et al., 2024; von Ingersleben-Seip, 2023). This confirms that AI has a conditional political effect, depending on the existence of checks and balances, an independent judiciary, media freedom, and civil society.

Importantly, the findings are consistent with broader trends in contemporary politics. The common assumption that technological progress automatically promotes democratization is simplistic. In fact, new technologies, including artificial intelligence, can strengthen both open and closed models of governance. In some situations, as the academic literature suggests (Dorogyy, Tsurkan, Mokhor, & Doroha-Ivaniuk, 2021; Sepasspour, 2023; Tache & Săraru, 2024) artificial intelligence has complemented mechanisms of representation and participation; in others, it serves as a laboratory for improved administrative oversight. The findings also show that AI-readiness measurement tools (such as GARI) do not capture a key parameter: the democratic orientation of the technologies. The readiness index captures the presence of competencies and institutions but is unable to distinguish whether these institutions provide public accountability or administrative control (Radanliev, 2025). This calls into question the adequacy of existing metrics

and suggests the need to develop new indicators that consider the legal and political quality of the use of artificial intelligence (Marino, Stilo, & Serra, 2025; Ndzendze & Marwala, 2023).

A major limitation of the study is the use of only cross-sectional data without panel dynamics. Democracy and technology policy are time-varying processes, and further validation of the results requires an analysis of the period 2018–2024 using the AI Preparedness Index (APII) and the Political Stability Indicators (WGI). Further research should also consider political crises, information campaigns, and the impact of AI on electoral processes. However, even at this stage, the results suggest convincingly: the future of the impact of artificial intelligence on politics is decided not in the sphere of technology, but in the sphere of institutions. Thus, artificial intelligence is neither democratic nor anti-democratic by nature. It is a mirror of the political systems into which it is implemented. Whether it becomes a means of emancipation or a means of control depends not on the algorithm, but on who sets the rules for this algorithm.

The limitations of this study are directly related to the chosen research design. First, the formation of the sample based on the availability of comparable data from the Government AI Readiness Index and the Democracy Index led to a certain selection of countries with relatively high levels of institutional and digital readiness. This sampling bias partly explains the lack of a statistically significant relationship between AI readiness and the level of democracy ($r \approx 0.02$), since the variability of democratic indicators among technologically advanced states is limited. Second, the small sample size ($N = 31$) and the cross-national cross-sectional nature of the study reduce the statistical power of the analysis and do not allow us to draw causal conclusions about the impact of artificial intelligence on political regimes. This is especially relevant for interpreting the moderate relationship between GARI and indicators of political stability ($r \approx 0.25$ – 0.30), which should be viewed as an association, rather than as evidence of causality.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The study revealed a fundamental feature of the impact of artificial intelligence on political systems: The readiness of states to implement AI, measured using GARI, is not a self-sufficient factor of democratic progress. Despite the presence of a high level of technological and institutional potential, no automatic connection was found between the level of readiness for AI and democracy.

This made it possible to establish that the development of digital tools did not guarantee the deepening of political participation or accountability of the authorities. The results of the use of AI directly depended on the political and legal context and the nature of state institutions. The empirical data obtained demonstrated two different models of the use of AI in world politics.

In the group of countries with a high level of democracy, AI was integrated as a means of improving public administration, ensuring transparency, and expanding citizen participation. At the same time, in countries with more centralized political regimes, the same technologies were used to strengthen administrative control and stability, without generating an increase in democratic indicators. Thus, AI is not a source of democratic transformation but a catalyst for the existing political model both liberal and technocratic control.

This observation had important theoretical significance. It showed that technological development can no longer be seen as a guarantor of political liberalization. On the contrary, AI revealed a deeper dependence between the institutional structure of the state and the trajectory of political change. The practical conclusions of the study emphasized the need to regulate the use of AI, moving from assessing “AI readiness” to assessing “AI responsibility and accountability.”

Existing indices should be supplemented with components that consider human rights, algorithmic transparency, and independent oversight. Regulatory initiatives such as the European AI Law have demonstrated the possibility of combining innovation with legal guarantees.

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