This study have examined the determinants of corruption in Nigeria's public sector using ten local government areas in Lagos State and Federal Capital Territory in Abuja during the period 2017-2018. Plethora of studies has analyzed the relationship between corruption and economic growth using different econometric techniques and statistical simulation. This study, however, departed from the common methodological approach by conducting a survey of corruption in public sector to ascertain its determinants. Findings from a survey of one thousand and seventy six (1976) subjects were documented and multiple variables emanated as critical determinants of corruption in public sector. The study recommends that policy makers should intensify efforts at re-orientating the society against the ills of corruption by establishing high ethical standards to which all and sundry must adhere.
Keywords: Abuja, Corruption, Growth, Lagos, Public sector, Survey
Received: 22 October 2018 / Revised: 26 November 2018 / Accepted: 19 December 2018/ Published: 16 January 2019
This study contributes to the existing body of literature by adopting a survey technique to ascertain the determinants of corruption in Nigeria's public sector by exploring ten (10) local government areas in Lagos State and Federal Civil Service in Abuja. A large number of studies in this area have employed theoretically established and econometric expositions to validate the determinants of corruption. The study uses common statistical technique to analyze both the causal and determinate variables motivating corruption.
Ordinarily, corruption embraces dishonest or illegal behavior of people saddled with responsibility of directing state activities, but chooses to circumvent the trust and divert resources for personal or pecuniary benefit. Corruption also denotes the act or effect of making an agent change from descent to immoral standard of behavior. Generally, corruption involves an arrangement between two parties, the demander and the supplier of benefits. The briber is the "demander of benefits" (agents seeking benefit) while the "supplier of benefit" is the public officer. A mutual price (bribe) is worked out in proportion of the weight attached to the benefits and risks exerted in making the transaction works. This description distinguishes the factors which drives the demand and the supply price of favour. In line with this, the World Bank (1998a) publicly declared corruption as flagrant abuse of public office through rent-seeking, patronage, nepotism, theft and diversion of state resources.
In most cases, corrupt practices are perpetrated away from the glare of public notice. The agents involved in the act would never volunteer to reveal the transactions details and level of involvement. Most discussions of corruption in the literature mainly centered on public sector transactions, with little emphasis on private sector transactions. Payment of bribes, extortion, theft of property, patronage and nepotism, diversion of resources, fraud, embezzlement, "brown envelope", "10% rule", among others, are clear examples of corruption. Two burgeoning views of corruption appears most prominent in the literature. The first view advocated a lubricating grease position of corruption on growth while the other perception maintained a venom position of corruption on growth. The justification advanced in favour of the first view was that an agent would be more effective and efficiently committed to assigned jobs if given a speed money or a tip. This position was seriously was seriously bemoaned and relegated in the literature. However, a large number of studies have aligned their thoughts to the second view on the ground that corruption has the potentials of reducing economic growth, ruined productivity strength and diverts resources away from creative to less productivity ones (see (Ogunlana, 2015; Ogun, 2016; Ogunlana and Olohunlana, 2016)).
Public sector is driven by efficient and effective utilization of workers. Over the past few years, public sector in Nigeria is riddled with corruption. Fraud, kickback, favouritism, bribery, embezzlement, over invoicing of contract, money laundering, looting of treasury, tribalism, nepotism, extortion and so on are ubiquitous manifestation of corruption in Nigeria's public sector. Regrettably, one can hardly consult the sector for official transactions without payment of bribes. This have led to poor service delivery, inefficiency, ineptitude, shirking, drop in productivity, financial impropriety, infrastructure decay, diversion of resources, stunted growth among others. In reaction to this, various governments in Nigeria have responded and set up a number of corruption tracking agencies in order to rejuvenate public sector for improved productivity and efficiency. The regimes of governments such as: Murtala/Obasanjo, Shehu Shagari, Buhari/Idiagbon introduced various agencies to tackle corruption. Recently, Obasanjo administration introduced Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) to tackle corruption. Despite the efforts made by various regimes to combat corruption in Nigeria, little progress was recorded due to policy summersaults and unseriousness on the part of law enforcers. The little progress recorded were superficial and mere paper work. This have plunged the economy into series of economic imbalances such as trade deficit, unemployment, poverty, recession, political unrest, religious riot, among others. Following this, the Transparency International(TI), renowned international agency saddled with the responsibility of compiling annual global corruption index of countries based on public perception ranked Nigeria as one of the most corrupt nation in the world (see Transparency International, website).
There is no economy that does not have a symptom of corruption. The level of occurrence and policy intervention matters. Most advanced countries of the world have been able to put in place proactive policies to combat corruption and at the same time make provisions for equity, justice and fairness in the allocation and distribution of resources. Moreover, the Asian countries, particularly Japan, China, Singapore, e.t.c have the most fantastic anti-corruption policy where corrupt agents are made to face stiff penalty, based on the dimension of involvement in corrupt practices. This has made public offices very unattractive to plunders and looters. On the contrary, in many African countries, particularly Nigeria, the punishment meted to corrupt agent is quite less punitive due to feeble judicial and institutional systems. This makes corruption more glorified in public sector of the economy. In view of this, the easiest way of accumulating quick money in Nigeria is corruption.
Recently, cases of corruption have risen tremendously at worrisome level to the detriment of Nigeria's economic growth. A number of theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the link between corruption and economic growth using different econometric expositions (see (Lawal and Tobi, 2006; Dike, 2011; Ijewereme and Dunmade, 2014; Ogunlana, 2015; Ogun, 2016; Ogunlana and Olohunlana, 2016)).These studies largely pointed at the detrimental influence of corruption on growth, productivity efforts, resource allocation, government spending, consumer's tastes, trade openness, investment, among others without dissecting the factors which determines corrupt practices. Public officers gets involved corrupt practices due to many factors. Apart from the theoretically established determinants of corruption in the literature, this study seeks to investigate the factors which determines corruption in Nigeria's public sector by exploring a survey methodology of ten(10) local government areas in Lagos State and Federal Civil Service in Abuja. The theoretical determinants of corruption include: political and judicial factors, historical factor, social and cultural factors and economic factor (see (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997;2001; Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Wei and Wu, 2001; Dreher and Siemers, 2003; Paldam, 2003)). The uniqueness of the study lies on choice of methodology adopted.
Corruption is a hydra-headed phenomenon that has many dimensional shapes. This position makes it difficult to ascribe a uniform accepted definition of it. The description of corruption depends the proclivity of the researcher and understanding of the concept. Apart from the fact that many definitions of corruption (see (Chakrabarti, 2000; Salisu, 2000; Obayelu, 2007; Waziri, 2010; Ijewereme and Dunmade, 2014)) upheld that corruption constitute illegal and immoral behavior of people in authority, misusing their position to solicit and extort bribes, favors cronies and family friends, steals, embezzle and divert state properties for personal benefits, corruption can also be explained within the context of principal-agent problem. The principal-agent is a phenomenon where the principal (superior officer) delegates authority and discretion to the agent (lower cadre officer) to act in the name of the principal in the dispensation of assignments. Corruption arises when the lower cadre officer misuse the discretion for personal benefits to the detriment of the principal. The difficulty of detection and associated answerability of assigned jobs completes the transaction. The scheme described here fits in appropriately with public sector framework.
It could be gleaned from the above description that corruption arises when there are available resources to be easily appropriated or transferred by public officers and that officers has high degree of discretional powers to allocate such resources. Specifically, in a market that has the feature of imperfect competition, rents are freely appropriated by market participants in various dimensions and this gives an incentive for the emergence of corruption. The other condition for corruption to prevail is the presence of individual with discretionary power over market outcome, particularly if such individual is imperfectly accountable for his decisions. This definition suggests that corruption is mainly domiciled in the public sector. Chakrabarti (2000) affirmed that corruption at the societal level is the outcome of individual choice of corruption levels and that choice is rooted in the risk-return trade off faced by an individual. The risk and return of corruption activity to the individual agents depend on the overall corruption level. The more widespread corruption is, the lower is its risk and rewards.
In the mid 1980's, some models were developed to formalize mechanisms in which corruption could enhance efficiency and promote growth. In particular, Lui (1985) used queue model to explain how bureaucrats extorts bribes from business firms in the allocation business licenses. This model argued that firms that has high prospects of securing government contracts offers bribes to bureaucrats in order to speed up procedures. Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986) developed an auction model, espousing the significance of bribes in a bidding process and how it enhances efficiency. This model argued that the most efficient firms have the resources to offer highest bribes during bargaining process. The regularity from the two models is that payment of bribes allows public officers to be more active, efficient and productive. However, this position would make public officers to create more rigidities in government business and at the same open window to extract bribes from the public. If bribes are used to speed up procedures, public officers may further slowdown the administrative procedures of government and create undue rigidities in procedures. This contradicts government intervention role in an economy.
The empirical literature analyzed the brunt of corruption from different perspectives. The most appealing standpoint looked at the effect of corruption on domestic investment, economic growth, government spending, infrastructure and human capital development.. The other less fancied perspective analyzed the impact of corruption on foreign direct investment inflow and economic growth (see (Mauro, 1996; Rahman et al., 1999; Ndikumana, 2007)). Mauro (1995;1996) championed the empirical documentation of corruption by investigating its relationship among private domestic investment, economic growth, government expenditure and education for 58 and 101 countries in two separate studies. The conclusion arrived at showed that corruption largely annihilate long term economic growth by constraining private domestic investment, distorted the composition of government spending particularly the share that goes into infrastructure and human capital development. In another study conducted by Tanzi and Davoodi (1998) on the effect of corruption on public expenditure, multiple findings were advanced which are practically similar to the findings of Mauro (1995;1996).
There is a wide support in the literature that the level of involvement of public officers in extortion, bribery, embezzlement, inflation of contracts, looting of treasury, diversion of funds, e.t.c has reached an unprecedented dimension in less developed countries and runs against the doctrine of growth (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Ogunlana, 2015). Oftentimes, the size of public sector investment is inhibited by corruption because items of expenditure are easily manipulated by high level officers for personal gain. The most nuanced situation is that corruption skewed the composition of public sector expenditure away from needed operation and maintenance towards acquisition of new equipment. Whenever corruption germinates in public sector, it reverberates on a number of development variables. Apart from the fact that it decimate and slows down growth process, it has distributional effect as it impact on the macroeconomic stability particularly on the cost of doing business, restrict access to basic infrastructure and deflating government revenue inflow.
It is clear from the reviewed studies that corruption in public sector does more harm to growth. In particular, studies which claimed that corruption is detrimental to growth do so on efficiency ground. Systematic empirical analyses of the causes of corruption in public sector have inundated the literature with theoretically derived motive, zeal and determinants of corruption. Practically, there is need to embark on investigative documentation of factors which determines corruption in public sector as it would leverage the theoretically established ones (Kaufmann, 1997; Wedeman, 1997).
Following the above review of literature, some lacunas are obvious and unavoidable. In most cases, getting an objective corruption index is very cumbersome and virtually all empirical works employed subjective corruption perception index developed by Transparency International to analyse corruption behaviour. This study slightly departs from this conventional method of generating data for corruption by conducting a survey of public sector with a view of ascertaining its determinants.
In order to achieve the objective of the study, convenience sampling technique was adopted. Convenience sampling is a non-probability sampling technique where subjects are selected based on accessibility and proximity to the researcher. The subjects are selected because they are very easy to recruit and accessible. This sampling technique was used because it is fast, inexpensive, easy and the subjects readily available.
3.1. Organization of the Survey
The survey was conducted in Lagos and Abuja. Questionnaire was given to the respondents to complete and hand in. The respondents were chosen based on the fact that they were readily available, convenient and accessible to the researcher. Accordingly, six criteria were applied in administering the questionnaire among the workers in the two chosen survey area. The criteria were based on monthly income stream of respondents in the following category: monthly income range: less than N10,000, monthly income range: N10,000 – N30,000, monthly income range: N31,000 – N50,000, monthly income range: N51, 000 – N70,000, monthly income range: N71,000 – N 100,000 and monthly income range: Above N100,000.
3.2. Study Population and Sample
The target population for the study consisted of all the public sector workers in Lagos and Abuja. Since the population is large, it is practically impossible to take a complete and comprehensive study of it due to the nature and dispersal of the elements in the population. Samples used for the study were selected from ten (10) local governments’ area in Lagos and Federal Civil Service Abuja. The total questionnaire administered was three thousand (3,000). From the total, two thousand five hundred (2,500) were returned, correctly filled ones totalled one thousand nine hundred and seventy six (1,976), badly filled totalled five hundred and twenty four (524). To that effect, a total sample of one thousand nine hundred and seventy six (1,976) subjects was used for the study. Lagos was chosen because it constitutes a thick commercial nerve centre and contains large population of workers. Abuja's inclusion can be justified from the view point that it is the administrative base of the nation and large numbers of civil servants work there.
4.1. Socio Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
The descriptive statistics of socio demographic features of the respondents is presented in Table 1. We could observed from the table that males dominated the samples with 63%, while females had 37%. The age groups below twenty (20) years are not relevant for the analysis of the study. The combined age brackets of people that falls within the range 30-39 and 40-49 years was 78%. These categories of age brackets are relevant for the analysis of the study. The survey indicated that 26% of the respondents were single, 72% married while 3% divorced. The distribution based on economic area of specialization indicated that 16% of the respondents are from commerce and industry, 19% engaged in private practice, 52% are public officers, 12% from academics and the remaining 2% came from the banking industry. This simply implies that public sector absorbed more workers than the other sectors of the economy. A large number of respondents, precisely 41% are public sector workers while other job types constituted smaller proportions of the sample. Educational qualification of workers is equally relevant to the discussion of corruption in public sector. Workers having secondary school education constituted about 8%, polytechnic education, 26%, college of education, 2%, university education, 57% and professional education, 6%. This implies that workers with higher educational qualification constituted a larger percentage of the sampled respondents.
4.2. Household Income in Relation to Productivity
The income received by households' representatives in the public office in exchange for services rendered played a critical role in corruption behavior. Respondents were asked to correlate their monthly income to productivity and work environment as indicated in Table 2 below. The table clearly showed that a large number of the sampled respondents are aware of the significance of their monthly income in exchange for productivity. Twenty nine per cent (29%) of the respondents were of the opinion that the income received does not measure appropriately with productivity. Forty-five per cent (45%) of the workers believed that the income received is grossly a subsistence income. Nine per cent (9%) of the workers consented that the monthly income remained perpetually compared with productivity efforts. Approximately seventeen per cent (17%) of the workers opined that the income received cannot address welfare needs. Work environment to a greater extent determines the pervasiveness of corruption and rent-seeking behaviour of workers. From the survey data, 40% of respondents opined that Nigeria’s work environment is strictly politically controlled. Responses that tilted to the opinion that the work environment is individually controlled constituted about 25% while 16% of the respondents believed that work environment in Nigeria is institutionally weak and largely bureaucratic in nature to prevent corruption from germinating.
Table-1. Descriptive Statistics of Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
Variables |
Frequencies (Percent) |
Gender |
|
Male |
1248 (63.2) |
Female |
728 (36.8) |
Total |
1976 (100) |
Age Group |
|
< 20 years |
78 (3.9) |
20-29 years |
311 (15.7) |
30-39 years |
1063 (53.8) |
40-49 years |
470 (23.8) |
50-59 years |
54 (2.7) |
Total |
1976 (100) |
Marital Status |
|
Single |
508 (25.7) |
Married |
1417 (71.7) |
Divorced |
51 (2.6) |
Total |
1976 (100) |
Main Area of Occupation where currently involved |
|
Commerce and industry |
309 (15.6) |
Private practice |
372 (18.8) |
Public Administration/ Government |
1025 (51.9) |
Education |
237 (12.0) |
Banking |
33 (1.7) |
Total |
1976 (100) |
Position currently Held |
|
Company Director |
46 (2.3) |
Partner in private practice |
132 (6.7) |
Manager |
508 (25.7) |
Supervisor |
251 (12.7) |
Internal Auditor |
129 (6.5) |
Fraud Examiner |
36 (1.8) |
Academic |
56 (2.8) |
Government/Public Official |
814 (41.2) |
Others |
4 (0.2) |
Total |
1976 (100) |
Years in Service |
|
< 1 year |
57 (2.9) |
1-5 years |
789 (39.9) |
6-10 years |
413 (20.9) |
11-15 years |
491 (24.8) |
> 15 years |
226 (11.4) |
Total |
1976 (100) |
Educational Qualification |
|
Secondary Education |
165 (8.4) |
Polytechnic |
522 (26.4) |
College of Education |
38 (1.9) |
University |
1131 (57.2) |
Professional |
120 (6.1) |
Total |
1976 (100) |
Source: Field Survey Data
Table-2. Household Income and Work Environment
Variables |
Frequencies (Percent) |
Annual Income Growth |
|
Income not commensurable with productivity |
570 (28.8) |
Income growth only a subsistence income |
898 (45.4) |
Income is infinitesimally low |
180 (9.1) |
Income is minimally acceptable |
328 (16.6) |
Total |
1976 (100.0) |
Income and Welfare Needs |
|
Sufficiently good |
128 (6.5) |
Below subsistence level |
564 (28.5) |
Minimally acceptable |
885 (44.8) |
Absolutely poor |
399 (20.0) |
Total |
1976 (100.0) |
Work Environment |
|
Strictly Bureaucratic |
390 (19.7) |
Institutionally weak |
313 (15.8) |
Politically controlled |
785 (39.7) |
Individually controlled |
488 (24.7) |
Total |
1976 (100.0) |
Rent Seeking |
|
Agreed |
904 (45.7) |
Strongly Agreed |
474 (24.0) |
Disagreed |
468 (23.7) |
Strongly Disagreed |
1 (0.1) |
Undecided |
129 (6.5) |
Total |
1976 (100.0) |
Source: Field Survey Data
4.3. Indicators and Causal Related Issues of Corruption
4.3.1. Rationale for Corruption
When asked to categorize corruption in public sector, 65% of the representative sample posited that corruption largely involve bribery and embezzlement of funds while 22% opined that corruption has to do with abuse/misuse of office for personal gain or pecuniary benefits. Table 3 showed the reasons for public sector corruption in Nigeria. Fifty five per cent (55%) of the respondents believed that poor wage and institutional structure topped the list of reasons why workers in public sector engaged in corrupt activities. Public sector workers actively involved in corrupt practices in order to maintain some established standard as espoused in the relative income hypothesis and life cycle hypothesis theory of consumption. Corruption cases are equally found in private establishments as well. In line with this thought, Seventy three per cent (73%) upheld the view that corruption mainly domiciled in public institutions while seven per cent (7%) believed that corruption cases were found in private establishments. Approximately eighteen per cent (18%) of the respondents shared the opinion that corruption takes place in both public and private institutions.
4.3.2. Determinants of Corruption in Nigeria
In order to ascertain the determinants of corruption in the public sector, respondents were asked to prioritized the factors motivating public sector corruption in Nigeria. Top on the survey data was low civil service remuneration and poor working condition not commensurate with productivity. As indicated by table 4, forty-six per cent (46%) of the respondents believed that workers in public sectors engaged in rent-seeking behaviour and corruption because of low wages and uncongenial working environment. Ten (10%) per cent of the respondents opined that weak institutions of the government provided a breeding motivation for corruption. The second critical determinants of corruption in Nigeria’s public sector as indicated in table 4 were weak and ineffective judicial system. In line with this, twenty one per cent (21%) of the respondents attested to the fact that ineffective legal systems contributed significantly to the growth of corruption in Nigeria's public sector.
Table-3. Rationale for Corruption in Nigeria
Variables |
Frequencies (Percent) |
Corruption in Nigeria |
|
Abuse/Misuse of Office |
437(22.1) |
Sale of government property |
1(0.1) |
Kickbacks in procurement contracts |
174(8.8) |
Diversion of resources |
81(4.1) |
Bribery and embezzlement of funds |
1284(64.9) |
Total |
1976(100.0) |
Public/Private Sector Corruption |
|
To maintain established standard |
178(9.0) |
To complement subsistence income |
521(26.4) |
Weak legal system |
125(6.3) |
Benefit/cost consideration |
56(2.8) |
Poor wage and institutional structure |
1096(55.4) |
Total |
1976(100.0) |
Location |
|
Public sector |
1448(73.3) |
Private sector |
128(6.5) |
Same in both sector |
348(17.6) |
Do not know |
52(2.6) |
Total |
1976(100.0) |
Source: Field Survey Data
The culture of affluence and ostentatious living which expects much from “big men”, extended family pressures, village/ethnic loyalties, and competitive ethnicity etc. influences corruption in public sector. The survey results showed that 5% of the respondents believed that the culture of affluence and ostentatious living energized corruption in the public sector. The political economy of Nigeria covers the democratic environment, effectiveness of the judicial system and governance culture. Eighteen per cent (18%) of the respondents opined that corruption in public sector largely related to the deficiencies of the political system in Nigeria. Natural resources endowments are one of the factors which featured in the literature promoting corruption. The justification here is that concentration of exports on natural resources is a proxy for rent-seeking opportunities. In order to corroborate this assertion, the survey data showed that 45% of the respondents believed that natural resource endowments is linearly and proportionally related to public sector corruption in Nigeria. The role of public sector in Nigeria affords public officials some degree of discretion in the allocation of goods and services provided. This mechanism is reinforced if the wages public officials received are relatively low. This increases the likelihood of corruption. Seventy-six per cent (76%) of the survey respondents supported this view, while 22% were against this position.
In most cases, causal variables are often used in the literature as determinants and indicators of corruption. This study has selected variables that are correlated with the pervasiveness of corruption to explain the determinants of corruption in Nigeria. Greed and lack in wants ranked highest among the listed factors (approximately 40% of the respondents shared this position) causing corruption. A desire to meet basic minimum necessity is another factor motivating corruption. Seven per cent (7%) of the survey respondents supported this position. Lack of information and transparency on rules and procedures ranked 17%. Corruption cases not prosecuted appropriately in the law courts and unfair business competition and practices ranked 8% and 10% respectively on the survey response. Unclear rules with loopholes for manipulation and non enforcement of rules and procedures ranked 4% and 3% respectively in the survey data. The survey data showed that lack of transparency and accountability accounted for 12% of corruption in Nigeria.
Table-4. Determinants of Corruption in Nigeria
Variables |
Frequencies (Percent) |
Determinants of Corruption |
|
Low wage and poor working condition |
914(46.3) |
Weak institution of government |
199(10.1) |
Ineffective legal system |
412(20.9) |
Culture of affluence and ostentatious living |
99(5.0) |
Political economy of Nigeria |
352(17.8) |
Total |
1976(100.0) |
Natural resource endowment factor |
|
Linear and proportional |
884(44.7)(100.0)proper accountability mechanismion and proceduresling |
Positive linkage |
732(37.0) |
No idea |
360(18.2) |
Total |
1976(100.0) |
Public and Private sector size factor |
|
Agreed |
953(48.2) |
Strongly Agreed |
544(27.5) |
Disagreed |
349(17.7) |
Strongly Disagreed |
84(4.3) |
Do not know |
46(2.3) |
Total |
1976(100.0) |
Causal determinants of corruption |
|
Wants, Greed, Never Enough |
791(40.0) |
Needs, Basic minimum not met |
144(7.3) |
Lack of information and transparency on rules and procedures |
327(16.5) |
Inaction of corruption cases reported |
158(8.0) |
Unfair business competition and practices |
198(10.0) |
Unclear rules with loopholes for manipulation |
78(3.9) |
Non enforcement of rules and procedures |
53(2.7) |
Poor or no proper accountability mechanism |
227(11.5) |
Total |
1976(100.0) |
Source: Field Survey Data
In a broad sense, this study have analyzed the determinants of corruption in Nigeria's public sector using ten selected local governments areas in Lagos State and Federal Capital Territory in Abuja during the period 2017-2018. Plethora of theoretical and empirical studies has analyzed the relationship between corruption and economic growth using different econometric techniques. This study departed from the common methodological approach by conducting a survey of corruption in public sector to ascertain its determinants.
The survey result indicated the following as determinants of corruption in Nigeria:
i. Low civil service salaries and poor working condition not commensurate with productivity, with few incentives and rewards for efficient performance.
ii. Failure of the legal system to provide for the enforcement of contracts undermines the operation of free markets and in turn, increases the incentives for agents to participate in unproductive activities.
iii. The culture of affluence and ostentatious living where man’s source of wealth is of no concern to the public or the government provides a fertile ground for corruption.
iv. Concentration of exports on natural resources.
v. Greed and lack in wants.
vi. A desire to meet basic minimum necessity of life.
vii. Unprosecuted cases of corruption.
viii. Unclear rules with loopholes for manipulation and non-enforcement of rules and procedures.
ix. Lack of transparency and accountability.
The following policy options are recommended in order to tackle corruption in public sector:
(i) Provision of basic core needs of the workers, particularly food, clothing, shelter and security. This would enhance productivity and de-emphasize corruption.
(ii) Investment in critical infrastructures such as transportation, electricity, water e.t.c. This would enhance public sector productivity.
(iii) Equitable and efficient income distribution commensurate with productivity and reward system.
(iv) Streamlining of judicial system in order to dispense judgement involving corruption cases with utmost urgency it requires.
(v) There is need by the policy maker to intensify efforts at re-orientating the society against the ills of corruption by establishing high ethical standards to which all and sundry must adhere.
Future studies in this endeavor can be directed to the effects and implication of corruption in Nigeria's public sector.
| Funding: This study received no specific financial support. |
| Competing Interests: The author declares that there are no conflicts of interests regarding the publication of this paper. |
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