International Journal of Public Policy and Administration Research
2024 Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 27-36
ISSN(e): 2312-6515
ISSN(p): 2313-0423
DOI: 10.18488/74.v11i2.3711

The impact of corruption on auditor independence: The case of gifts and discounts

Neef Alwadani[1] +
Khaled Aljaaidi[2]

[1,2]*Accounting Department, College of Business Administration, Prince Sattam bin Abdulaziz University, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.*
[1]*Email: n.alwadani@psau.edu.sa*
[2]*Email: k.aljaaidi@psau.edu.sa*

(+ Corresponding author)

Article History
Received: 18 December 2023
Revised: 13 February 2024
Accepted: 4 March 2024
Published: 9 April 2024

Keywords
Auditor independence
Gifts and discounts
Saudi Arabia.

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the correlation between auditors' acceptance of gifts and discounts (AGD) and the potential undermining of auditor independence, akin to bribery. Bribery usually encompasses the exchange of valuable items, such as money, gifts, or favors, in return for influence or favors. Both "gifts" and "discounts" have the potential to constitute bribery, depending on the circumstances. Therefore, in specific contexts, the giving or receiving of gifts and discounts might be viewed as bribery if their intention is to unduly influence someone's actions or decisions. This study comprises a final sample of 62 audit firms in Saudi Arabia. The simple regression results highlight a significant negative correlation between auditors' perceptions of accepting gifts and discounts, and their independence. The act of receiving gifts and benefits establishes a close tie between auditors and their clients, influencing auditors' behavior. The study suggests that the higher the value of a gift or benefit, the more pronounced the threat to auditor independence. Furthermore, even minimal gift and discount arrangements have a significant impact on auditor independence. The insights gained from this study can be of substantial value to the accounting and auditing professions, audit firms, standards setters, and auditing regulators, fostering a deeper understanding of the degree to which gifts and discounts affect auditor independence.

Contribution/Originality: This study contributes to the existing body of knowledge by adding new empirical evidence that fills a gap in current research about how accepting gifts and discounts impacts the independence of audit firms and accountants in Saudi Arabia, where there is a lack of research in this important economy.

1. INTRODUCTION

Bribery poses a hindrance to economic growth, as indicated by Sanyal and Samanta (2010), and is ethically questionable due to its infringement on individual rights, irrespective of potential benefits (Baron, Pettit, & Slote, 1997; McGee, Petrides, & Ross, 2012). Anthropological research has shown that gifts and bribes, which are considered normative institutions, may be subject to both formal and informal regulations (Anders & Nuijten, 2008). The exchange of valuable gifts and benefits can foster a close relationship between auditors and clients, influencing auditor behavior. However, public displays, such as advertising materials, do not directly compromise auditor independence (Baabbad, Abidin, & Habtoor, 2021). Additionally, the study by Pany and Reckers (1980) reveals that even modest gifts or discounts can significantly shape users' perceptions of auditor independence.

This study seeks to investigate external auditors' perspectives on the acceptance of gifts and discounts from clients and the potential impact of these practices on auditor independence, with a specific focus on gift-giving and discounts. Existing studies, as highlighted by Baabbad et al. (2021) and Pany and Reckers (1980), show a limited exploration of external auditors' perspectives on gifts and discounts in client transactions. Notably, there is currently no empirical research in Saudi Arabia that specifically delves into auditors' attitudes toward gift-giving and discounts based on the available knowledge of the researchers.

The significance of this study lies in its contribution to explaining the repercussions of external auditors when they receive gifts and discounts from clients. It seeks to shed light on the degree to which auditors engage in such incentives while addressing enduring and substantial concerns related to auditor independence. Notably, this research stands out as it introduces new empirical evidence to fill the existing gap in studies on the impact of accepting gifts and discounts on the independence of audit firms and accountants in Saudi Arabia. This is particularly crucial in the context of the prevailing ethical challenges in contemporary accounting research. This investigation was conducted within a constrained research context. This study highlights the importance of practices that could impact auditor independence and provide potential benefits for audit firms. Importantly, Saudi Arabia's Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index score rose from 51 out of 100 in 2022 to 54 out of 180 in 2023. The Corruption Index for Saudi Arabia averaged 44.70 points from 2003 to 2022, reaching its highest point of 53.00 in 2019 and its lowest at 33.00 in 2006 (Transparency International, 2023).

The subsequent parts of the paper can be outlined as follows: A literature review and the development of the hypothesis are covered in the second section. The third part highlights the research methodology. In the fourth section, the analysis and interpretations are thoroughly examined, and the concluding section draws final remarks.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Both gifts and bribery operate within complex legal frameworks and contribute to social institutions' functioning. Anthropologists, such as Anders and Nuijten (2008), propose that gifts and bribes are informal exchange processes regulated by a variety of formal and informal rules. Logue (2005) argued that bribery is inherently unethical, violating fundamental moral principles that cannot be compromised. Logue further contends that bribery undermines the constructive role of government, leading to increased inequality and inefficient resource allocation. This perspective is supported by the findings of Sanyal and Samanta (2010), who highlighted the negative impact of bribery on economic progress.

In the Tian (2008) study on Chinese company managers, the influence of moral values on corrupt payments like gifts, bribes, and kickbacks was investigated. Mainland Chinese managers were the focus of the research. The findings indicated a significant link between moral relativism and a positive view of bribery and kickbacks among these managers. However, attitudes toward gift-giving were unaffected by moral ideals or relativism, indicating its widespread acceptance as an economic practice in Chinese cultural society.

Offering gifts, illegal kickbacks, and bribes involves providing money or favors with the intention of influencing someone to act in favor of the giver. As outlined by Tian (2008), these tactics are frequently directed toward public officials seeking to persuade them to disregard the laws established for the common good. Corruption increases business expenses in two ways. Initially, the act of paying bribes escalated the costs associated with providing goods and services. Second, corruption amplifies financial costs by elevating the risk premium (Wu, 2009). Virtually any valuable item can serve as a gift. However, gifts are not limited to tangible objects; they can also manifest as services, reciprocal favors, intangible offerings, or counter-gifts originating from various sources. Such contributions can come from a community or family can take the form of symbolic capital that include things like respect, honor, nobility, or recognition (Bourdieu, 1997; Graycar & Jancsics, 2017; Larsen & Watson, 2001; Murcott, 1983).

Considering companies solely as victims of corruption is inadequate; they may be pressured to pay "facilitation fees" for services they are legally entitled to in certain corrupt scenarios. However, it's vital to understand that businesses aren't always the instigators of fraudulent transactions. Motivations behind such actions may include securing public contracts, tax evasion, legal violations, or preventing competitors from accessing profitable markets (Powpaka, 2002; Rose-Ackerman, 2002; Wu, 2009).

In Indian, Persian, and Arabian cultures, the practice of extending unwavering hospitality to outsiders is noteworthy, reflecting a sense of communal respect through indirect reciprocity (Offer, 1997). Both gifts and bribes serve advantageous purposes, fostering social unity across different socioeconomic levels. The universal principles guiding bribery and gift-giving not only encourage reciprocity but also govern the exchange process, necessitating a reciprocal gesture. Anthropologists contend that while gifts and bribes may share normative parallels, they embody distinct forms of social behavior (Graycar & Jancsics, 2017; Shore & Haller, 2005; Smart & Hsu, 2008).

Baabbad et al. (2021) explore the impact of bribery on auditor independence by examining the gifts and benefits offered to auditors by their clients. Employing a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, including questionnaires and interviews, the researchers assessed the perspectives of various stakeholders in the Yemeni setting concerning auditor independence, such as auditors, tax officers, bank loan officers, financial directors, and academics. The findings of the study indicate that threats to auditor independence increase proportionally with the value of a gift or benefit. This pattern is attributed to the establishment of a close relationship between auditors and clients due to gifts and rewards, which impacts the behavior of auditors. Interviewees concurred that any direct gifts or incentives offered to auditors would threaten their independence. However, gifts or perks intended for the public, such as pens and diaries for promotional purposes, were deemed to have no impact on auditor independence.

Graycar and Jancsics (2017) argued that the exchange of gifts fosters reciprocity and strengthens social bonds. They highlight that if both the gift and reciprocation originate from personal resources, they qualify as genuine gifts. Conversely, if reciprocation follows the gift and is funded by a government entity or organization rather than an individual's funds, it is more likely to be considered a bribe. Pany and Reckers (1980) investigated stockholders' perceptions of the impact of gifts, purchase discount arrangements, and relative size of their clients on auditor independence. Their findings revealed that even small gifts and discounts significantly influence perceptions of auditor independence.

Wu (2009) examined the prevalence of bribery in Asian companies and evaluated ten hypotheses regarding its origins through experimentation. Employing data from the World Business Environment Survey, the researcher analyzed distinct characteristics of bribery within Asian enterprises. The investigation identified corporate governance, growth rate, and company size as significant factors influencing bribery within firms. Furthermore, it revealed that Asian businesses are more inclined to participate in bribery under specific conditions, such as in highly competitive markets, with unreliable legal systems, complex licensing procedures, ambiguous regulatory interpretations, inadequate government services, and high tax burdens.

The above discussions make us predict the following testable hypothesis:

H_1: The acceptance of gifts and discounts by auditors from their clients impacts the auditor independence.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Questionnaire Design

This study employs a survey-based methodology to collect data from licensed audit firms using a structured questionnaire. The study is designed to investigate the research question, "To what extent does the acceptance of gifts and discounts impact auditor independence?" using a quantitative approach. This research anticipates that, within the Saudi Arabian context, the act of accepting gifts and discounts will influence auditor independence. The conceptual framework was adapted from various relevant empirical studies (Baabbad et al., 2021; Graycar & Jancsics, 2017; Hernandez & McGee, 2014; Pany & Reckers, 1980; Tian, 2008; Wu, 2009). The questionnaire consists of two distinct sections. The first section gathers demographic details from participants, and the subsequent section comprises thirteen statements explaining the perceived negative impact of accepting gifts and discounts on auditor independence.

3.2. Instrument of Measurement

3.2.1. Demographic Information

The research examined various demographic factors, including gender, age, country of origin, educational level, job role, years of professional experience, accreditation, specialization, audit firm tenure, workforce size, number of licensed auditors, and auditor classification. Gender was assigned the code "1" for males and "2" for females, while nationality was coded "1" for Saudi nationality and "2" for non-Saudi nationality. Age groups were categorized as "1" for individuals under 30, "2" for those aged 30 to 35, "3" for ages 36 to 40, "4" for ages 41 to 45, "5" for ages 46 to 50, and a separate code for respondents over 50.

The nominal values "1" signify a bachelor's degree, "2" indicate a master's degree, and "3" represent a doctorate concerning academic qualifications. In terms of job positions, "1" is assigned to auditors, "2" to auditing managers, "3" to auditor assistants, "4" to partners, and "5" to various other job roles. The nominal values "1" for less than five years, "2" for five to ten years, "3" for eleven to fifteen years, "4" for sixteen to twenty years, and "5" for twenty years and above, denote work.

In terms of professional certifications, SOCPA is given the code "1", ACCA is designated as "2", other CPA certificates originating from the United States are labeled "3", CPA certificates from countries beyond Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are represented by "4", and "5" denotes professional certifications that are unavailable. Accounting is represented by the code "1", while other specializations such as management, finance, business, economics, and related fields are classified as "2". The age of the audit firm is indicated by numerical values: "1" for firms under five years old, "2" for those aged 5–10 years, "3" for firms aged 11–15 years, "4" for firms aged 16–20 years, "5" for those aged 21–25 years, and "6" for firms exceeding 25 years old. Concerning the number of employees, "1" is assigned to firms with less than five employees, "2" for those with five to ten employees, "3" for firms with eleven to twenty employees, and "4" for firms employing more than twenty-five employees.

A nominal value of "1" signifies one licensed auditor, "2" indicates two licensed auditors, and "3" corresponds to three licensed auditors. The categorization of the number of licensed auditors includes a value of "4" for four licensed auditors and "5" for five or more licensed auditors. In terms of the auditor type, a nominal value of "1" is associated with Big Four audit firms, "2" with international audit firms, and "3" with local audit firms.

3.2.2. The Gift-Giving, Discounts of Purchases, and the Auditor Independence

The central aspect revolves around external auditors' sentiments regarding receiving gifts and discounts from their clients. The pivotal determinant shaping this perspective is the acceptance of gifts and discounts and their subsequent impact on auditor independence. To assess both independent and dependent variables, a five-point Likert scale was used, where a rating of 5 signifies strong agreement and 1 denotes strong disagreement on a scale from 1 to 5. A score of five (strongly agree) signifies the utmost concurrence with the acceptance of gift-giving discounts on purchases and its subsequent impact on auditor independence. Conversely, a score of 1 (strongly disagree) indicates the lowest level of agreement. The independent variable involves nine factors gauging the extent of acceptance of client gifts and discounts, while the dependent variable is appraised through four items. The elucidating the perceived influence of gift-giving and discounts on auditor independence the items measuring the independent variable include the following:

AGD1: I can accept a small gift in kind (e.g., pens, souvenirs, wallet, desk lamp, perfume, etc.) from a company I audit.

AGD2: I can accept an expensive gift in kind (for example, a mobile phone, laptop, electrical appliances, jewelry, etc.) from a company I audit.

AGD3: I don't mind accepting a gift of cash, cash equivalents (for example, checks, coupons, or gift cards), or loans from my client.

AGD4: I can accept job opportunities offered by the companies I audit for the benefit of my family members or relatives.

AGD5: I can accept gifts from companies I audit during religious occasions such as Ramadan and Eid.

AGD6: I feel grateful and satisfied when the company I am auditing provides expensive hospitality, travel, lodging, and meal duties (e.g., premium first-class and business-class tickets, five-star hotels, resorts, and premium restaurants).

AGD7: I feel satisfied when the company I am auditing provides hospitality, travel, lodging and meals duties in a reasonable and unobtrusive manner.

AGD8: I can accept discounts on my purchases from the company I audit.

AGD9: I'm grateful that the company I'm auditing sells its products to me at wholesale prices.

As for the dependent variable items, they are as follows:

DV1: Accepting small gifts and gratuities affects the independence of the external auditor.

DV2: Accepting expensive gifts and gratuities affects the independence of the external auditor.

DV3: Accepting discounts on minor purchases affects the independence of the external auditor.

DV4: Accepting discounts on purchases in large amounts affects the independence of the external auditor.

3.3. Model Specification and Analysis

This research aims to explore how auditors perceive the receipt of gifts and discounts (AGD) and the potential implications for compromising auditor independence, often viewed as bribery (AIGD). The conceptual model for this study is outlined as follows:



Figure 1. Theoretical framework.

Figure 1 illustrates the impact of auditors' acceptance of gifts and discounts (AGD) and the potential undermining of auditor independence, akin to bribery. The data collected for the study were analyzed using SPSS version 20 for Windows, employing a variety of statistical techniques. The statistical methods included frequencies and percentages, simple regression, Cronbach's alpha, correlation analysis, and factor analysis.

3.4. Data Collection

The study enlisted external auditors who held licenses from the Saudi Organization for Chartered and Professional Accountants (SOCPA) in Saudi Arabia. Respondents accessed the surveys through a link provided on Google Forms, known for its intuitive interface. The researchers personally distributed the survey link to their network of licensed external auditors via various social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, WhatsApp groups, and email. Furthermore, an official request for assistance in data collection was sent to SOCPA via email. Data collection occurred between September and November 2023, with a total of 62 auditors actively engaging in the survey by completing the questionnaire.

4. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATIONS

4.1. Sample Characteristics

Table 1 indicates that the majority of the sample (91.9 %) comprised males, while females constituted 8.1%. Noteworthy demographic features of the respondents, 66.1% were Saudi nationals, 22.6% were older than 60, 59.7% held a bachelor's degree, and 96.8% specialized in accounting. Additionally, a significant portion of the participants served as auditors (45.8%), had more than 20 years of work experience (33.9%), held a professional certificate from the SOCPA (50%), and were affiliated with local audit firms (75.8%).

Table 1. Sample characteristics.

Demographic information	Frequency (n = 62)	Percent %
Gender		
Male	57	91.9
Female	5	8.1
Nationality		
Saudi	41	66.1
Non-Saudi	21	33.9
Age		
Less than 30	7	11.3
30-35	13	21
36-40	13	21
41-45	6	9.7
46-50	9	14.5
Above 50	14	22.6
Job position		
Partner	28	45.2
Auditing manager	15	24.2
Auditor	10	16.1
Auditor assistance	1	1.6
Others	8	12.9
Academic qualification		
Bachelor degree	37	59.7
Master degree	23	37.1
PhD	2	3.2
Others	5	13.2
Experience		
Less than 5 years	9	14.5
5-10	14	22.6
11-15	9	14.5
16-20	9	14.5
Above 20	21	33.9
Professional certificates		
SOCPA	31	50
ACCA	1	1.6
CPA-USA	7	11.3
CPA	6	9.7
None	17	27.4
Specialization		
Accounting	60	96.8
Non-accounting	2	3.2
Auditor type		
Big 4 audit firm	15	24.2
Local audit firm	47	75.8

4.2. Summary Statistics

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for each dimension related to auditors' acceptance of gifts and discounts (AGD) and its potential impact, viewed as bribery, on the diminishing auditor independence (AIGD). The presented statistics included the mean, standard deviation, and standard error of the mean.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics.

Items	Mean	Std. dev.
GD1	3.10	1.364
AGD2	1.31	0.642
AGD3	1.31	0.667
AGD4	2.34	1.241
AGD5	2.48	1.251
AGD6	2.06	1.038
AGD7	3.42	1.139
AGD8	2.40	1.234
AGD9	2.50	1.340
DV1	2.98	1.299
DV2	4.40	1.032
DV3	3.03	1.173
DV4	4.16	1.190
Overall	2.73	1.12

Table 2 illustrates that the standard deviations for the individual items varied between 1.364 and 0.642, while the item means ranged from 1.31 4.40. The Likert-scale coding, as shown in Table 3, is exemplified below.

Table 3. The degrees of the 5-point Likert scale.

Response	Strongly agree	Agree	Natural	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Score	5	4	3	2	1
Degree of agreement	Too high	High	Moderate	Low	Very low
The mean	4.20-5	3.40-4.19	2.60-3.39	1.8-2.59	1-1.79
Relative weight	Greater than 84%	68%-83.9%	52%-67%	36%-51.9%	Less than 36%

An approach towards (1) indicates a decreased level of agreement, with a higher degree of agreement corresponding to a closer proximity to (5). Table 4 outlines the highest and lowest rankings of the independent items. Respondents assigned the lowest rank (1.31) to items (AGD3) and (AGD2), while item (AGD7) received the highest ranking (3.42).

Table 4. The rank and degrees of the 5-point Likert scale.

Items	Mean	Rank	Degree of agreement
AGD7	3.42	1	High
AGD1	3.10	2	Moderate
AGD9	2.50	3	Moderate
AGD5	2.48	4	Low
AGD8	2.40	5	Low
AGD4	2.34	6	Low
AGD6	2.06	7	Low
AGD2	1.31	9	Very low
AGD3	1.31	10	Very low
DV2	4.40	12	Too high
DV4	4.16	13	High
DV3	3.03	14	Moderate
DV1	2.98	15	Moderate

Table 4 indicates that item (DV2) achieved the highest ranking (4.40) as part of the dependent variable, whereas item (DV1) achieved the lowest ranking (2.98).

4.3. Measurement Model

The findings from the Cronbach's alpha test presented in Table 5 affirm the reliability of the scales employed for the variables under examination. The Composite Reliability (CR) outcome in Table 5 provides evidence supporting the reliability of the scales for the aspects being investigated.

Table 5. Constructs' validity and reliability.

Constructs	Items	Factor loadings	Cronbach's alpha	CR	AVE
AGD	AGD1	0.746	0.883	0.906	0.522
	AGD2	0.542			
	AGD3	0.540			
	AGD4	0.739			
	AGD5	0.831			
	AGD6	0.664			
	AGD7	0.664			
	AGD8	0.862			
	AGD9	0.835			
DV	DV1	0.798	0.859	0.740	0.422
	DV2	0.826			
	DV3	0.911			
	DV4	0.830			

4.4. Hypothesis Testing

Using a simple regression analysis, an investigation was conducted to assess the association between auditors accepting gifts and discounts (AGD) and the likelihood of categorizing such behavior as bribery, thereby compromising auditor independence (AIGD), as presented in Table 6.

Table 6. Simple regression results.

	Coef.	T	P> |t|
(Constant)	4.574	12.561	0.000
AIU	-0.400	-2.700	0.009
R^2	0.108		
P-value	0.001		
Model F-stat.	7.288		
Sig.	0.009		

Note: Bold = Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (One-tailed significance).

The statistically significant F-value at the 1% level of the AIGD model supported its overall interpretability. With an R2 value of 10.8%, the AIGD model effectively explains the substantial variance associated with auditors accepting gifts and discounts—behavior that may be construed as bribery—and its detrimental impact on auditor independence. This underscores the relevance and suitability of AIGD models. The results reveal a significantly negative relationship between accepting gifts and discounts and auditor independence ($p < 0.009$, two-tailed significance), aligning with findings from previous studies (Baabbad et al., 2021; Pany & Reckers, 1980).

Establishing a personal connection between a client and an auditor through the provision of gifts and other advantages influences auditor conduct. The degree of this influence escalates in tandem with the magnitude of the gift or benefit, thereby presenting escalating threats to auditor independence. Moreover, it has been confirmed that even modest gifts and discounts exert a notable impact on auditor independence. When differentiating between a gift and a potential bribe, it becomes apparent that a gift is unequivocally considered as such when both the gift and reciprocation are privately funded. Conversely, if reciprocation stems from government or organizational funds rather than private sources, it is more likely to be perceived as a bribe.

5. CONCLUSION

The primary aim of this study was to explore the relationship, akin to bribery, between auditors accepting gifts and discounts and the potential compromise of auditor independence. The final sample comprised 62 audit firms in Saudi Arabia. The findings reveal a substantial association, akin to bribery, between auditors succumbing to gifts and discounts and the erosion of their independence. This outcome holds significance in addressing enduring and critical issues that contribute to enhancing the quality of the auditing profession, thereby narrowing the expectation gap in auditing and instilling greater confidence in the services provided by external auditors. Furthermore, this study fills a research gap by providing empirical data in a field where no previous research on the impact of accepting gifts and discounts on auditor independence has been conducted. Furthermore, the study provides useful information to audit companies by illuminating variables that may jeopardize their independence. This in turn aids in identifying clients' strengths and weaknesses while encouraging logical decision-making, the use of credible information, and a reduction in fraud and fraud rates.

This study has several notable limitations that could be addressed in future research. First, the initial sample size is limited to 62 firms. Expanding this sample size in subsequent research could improve the generalizability of the findings. Second, to attain more nuanced insights, future research could consider utilizing interviews as an alternative to the survey methodology employed in this study. Third, this study concentrated on the Saudi context. Subsequent studies may explore whether similar trends exist in other GCC nations, such as the UAE, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, given their comparable economic and cultural settings.

Funding: This research is supported by Prince Sattam bin Abdulaziz University, Saudi Arabia (Grant number: PSAU/2023/03/2512).
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Transparency: The authors state that the manuscript is honest, truthful, and transparent, that no key aspects of the investigation have been omitted, and that any differences from the study as planned have been clarified. This study followed all writing ethics.
Data Availability Statement: The corresponding author can provide the supporting data of this study upon a reasonable request.
Competing Interests: The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors' Contributions: Determined the identification of the problem, data collection and analysis, N.A.; the literature review and designing the study, N.A. and K.A. Both authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

REFERENCES

Anders, G., & Nuijten, M. (2008). Corruption and the secret of law: An introduction. In M. Nuijten, & G. Anders (Ed.), Corruption and the secret of law: A legal anthropological perspective. In (pp. 1–26). Abingdon, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.

Baabbad, M. A., Abidin, S., & Habtoor, O. (2021). Bribery and perceived auditor independence. *Journal of Economic Additions*, *5*(1), 240-246.

Baron, M. W., Pettit, P., & Slote, M. (1997). *Three methods of ethics*. Malden, MA & Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.

Bourdieu, P. (1997). Marginalia—Some additional notes of the gift. In Schrift (Ed.), The logic of the gift. In (pp. 231–241). New York: Routledge.

Graycar, A., & Jancsics, D. (2017). Gift giving and corruption. *International Journal of Public Administration*, *40*(12), 1013-1023.

Hernandez, T., & McGee, R. W. (2014). The ethical perceptions of bribe taking in four Muslim countries. *Journal of Accounting, Ethics and Public Policy*, *15*(1), 185-237.

Larsen, D., & Watson, J. J. (2001). A guide map to the terrain of gift value. *Psychology & Marketing*, *18*(7), 657-661. https://doi.org/10.1002/mar.1024

Logue, N. C. (2005). *Cultural relativism or ethical imperialism? Dealing with bribery across cultures*. Paper presented at the CBFA Conference.

McGee, R. W., Petrides, Y., & Ross, A. M. (2012). Ethics and tax evasion: A study of Mexican opinion. In R.W. McGee (Ed.), The Ethics of Tax Evasion: Perspectives in Theory and Practice. In (pp. 387-403). New York: Springer.

Murcott, A. (1983). It's a pleasure to cook for him. In E. Gamarnikov, D. Morgan, J. Purvis, & D. Taylorson (Eds.), The Public and the Private. In (pp. 78–90). London, UK: Heinemann.

Offer, A. (1997). Between the gift and the market: The economy of regard. *The Economic History Review, 50*(3), 450-476.

Pany, K., & Reckers, P. M. (1980). The effect of gifts, discounts, and client size on perceived auditor independence. *Accounting Review, 55*(1), 50-61.

Powpaka, S. (2002). Factors affecting managers' decision to bribe: An empirical investigation. *Journal of Business Ethics, 40*(3), 227-246. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020589612191

Rose-Ackerman, S. (2002). "Grand" corruption and the ethics of global business. *Journal of Banking & Finance, 26*(9), 1889-1918. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(02)00197-8

Sanyal, R., & Samanta, S. (2010). Relationship between bribery and economic growth: An empirical analysis. *Indian Journal of Economics & Business, 9*(1), 133-145.

Shore, C., & Haller, D. (2005). Introduction - sharp practice: Anthropology and the study of corruption. In D. Haller, & C. Shore (Ed.), Corruption: Anthropological perspectives. In (pp. 1–26). London, UK: Pluto Press.

Smart, A., & Hsu, C. L. (2008). Corruption or social capital? Tact and the performance of Guanxi in market socialist China. In M. Nuijten, & G. Anders (Ed.), Corruption and the secret of law: A legal anthropological perspective. In (pp. 167–191). Abingdon, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.

Tian, Q. (2008). Perception of business bribery in China: The impact of moral philosophy. *Journal of Business Ethics, 80*, 437-445. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-007-9429-x

Transparency International. (2023). *Saudi Arabia*. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/saudi-arabia

Wu, X. (2009). Determinants of bribery in Asian firms: Evidence from the world business environment survey. *Journal of Business Ethics, 87*, 75-88. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-008-9871-4