Up or Down! House Management and Public Finance Theory from America’s Era of Hastert

Abstract

This primarily conceptual article hypothesizes that the deep divisions in United States politics can in part be traced to the “Hastert Rule,” a management practice since the 1990s which limits lawmakers individual respect, legitimacy, and power. The article first philosophically analyzes the noticeable change in discourse since the “Hastert Rule,” from “compromise” to “common ground.” Next the article offers a regression showing the Hastert Rule’s impact on volume of bills passed, and on public opinion, then arguing via Public Finance/Choice Economics that this management practice has led to changes in American society. A strong case regression is run concerning immigration. The results show that the Hastert Rule has hardened party lines and the public is voting for candidates according issues they suspect are not favored by the opposite party, here termed “median-division” theory. The article concludes with policy suggestions to give individual lawmakers and voters more power over legislative management- up or down!